The conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade was organized when Indonesia and other countries of Asia and Africa were attempting to organize a Second Bandung Conference. Tito and Nehru, trying to minimize the influence of China in the Asian and African countries, initiated a conference that they called the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade. The document discusses the 24 participating countries, the agenda, the proceedings, the different groups among the delegation and the two main documents that the conference adopted: the manifesto and the declaration. The manifesto, titled “The Danger from the War and the Call for Peace,” according to the Albanian ambassador, was adopted in a revisionist spirit, calling on Khrushchev and Kennedy to maintain peace. Meanwhile, the declaration criticized colonialism and imperialism. The Belgrade conference did not decide on any specific issues and did not reach any important conclusions. In Albania, a week after the conference, the journal “Zeri i Popullit” (Voice of the People) wrote an article in which it identified Tito as an agent of imperialism and stated that Yugoslavia was not an non-aligned country as it participated in the Balkan Pact.

Report form Carlos Rafael Rodriguez about his interview with Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow on 11 December 1962. "Dinner with Khrushchev" notes: Rodriguez writes about a dinner he attended with Mikoyan, Khrushchev, official delegates, and friends.

Khrushchev reports on his conversations with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders during his visit to Yugolsavia. The first conversation addressed the bread shortage in Yugoslavia, a trade agreement between the two countries and the structure of Yugoslav agriculture. The second conversation addressed Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the issues of building socialism, the international press, Marxist-Leninist policy, and Yugoslav relations with other European socialist countries.

Khrushchev describes his conversations with Josip Broz Tito regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The leaders discussed Yugoslavia's need for economic and technological assistance from the Soviet Union; socialist methods and ideology; alignment on international issues; and amnesty for Communist fugitives returning to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev expresses concern about the behavior of Yugoslav diplomats and the Yugoslav press. He recommends to the CPSU CC that increasing contact with Yugoslav leaders will facilitate rapprochement between the Parties.

These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.

Letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to Yugoslav leader Josep B. Tito suggesting that the time is ripe for a rapprochement between the two states and parties. Blaming former NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria and former Yugoslav leadership member Milovan Djilas for doing the work of the imperialists by attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet and Yugoslav people and parties, Khrushchev suggests that the ousting of both will increase rapprochement between the two countries and be the catalyst for a a summit between the two leaders.

Yugoslav response to Soviet approaches about normalizing relations between the two countries and the two parties. While encouraged by the Soviet gestures, the Yugoslav leadership remains cautious and suggests that the rapprochement take a slow and steady course, taking into account the differences as well as the similarities between the two countries.

Nikita Khrushchev’s letter to Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito concerning the possibility of improving relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet leader suggests that rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia can only be accomplished if both parties continue the exchange of views regarding mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country, peaceful coexistence, equality among parties, and world peace. Khrushchev goes on to suggest that a summit between party representatives should meet in order to further rapprochement.

The CC CPSU leadership letter of apology to the CC LCY for “an inappropriate formulation” that had escaped Soviet censors concerning the Yugoslav leadership in the second edition of the book Historical Materialism

Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.