Eliot forwards a letter sent to William J. Galloway of the American Embassy in London, containing information for the British Foreign Office about US nuclear assistance to France. The letter describes the current status of cooperation between the US and France, including the preparations for nuclear safety talks and the first meeting with the French ballistic missile project.

Handyside sends guidance for discussions with British diplomat Clive Rose on US nuclear assistance to France. The cable outlines points of discussion and emphasizes the secret nature of these talks as "we do not plan to inform French of fact that we are keeping UK generally informed."

Discussion of French Minister of Defense Debré's six day visit to the United States in July 1972. The Department of Defense is refusing to share with the Department of State information about technical discussions with Debré's delegation. John Foster, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, may have promised the French "sensitive strategic weapons technology" which cannot be given to them. The French "wish list" of assistance goes beyond the current restrictions to only help with existing systems, and not to provide the French with any new capabilities.

This speculates on the French/U.S. missile connection and notes that Blancard is probably a key player, having most likely met with officials in Washington. Blancard would have reported any such talks to Galley, and so Schlesinger will need to be properly informed about the situation before meeting with Galley.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

The United States wants a public announcement from the French that the Pakistan plutonium reprocessing plant project is officially canceled.

Plans for meetings with Congress members to discuss resuming aid to Pakistan. Talking points include the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant deal and the importance of Pakistan's position in the Middle East. Also includes discussion of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, technical capabilities, and the United States' efforts to block their nuclear development.

Request for the Paris Embassy to discreetly look into an export license granted to the French company Robatel to export centrifuges to Pakistan.

Summary of a British report on problems with the export "trigger list" of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The list did not include gray area items that could be used in building nuclear facilities. To begin correcting the problem, the British announced a ban of inverter exports and asked other governments to take parallel steps. Also includes a summary of a secret British paper on Pakistan nuclear intentions. The British believed that the “piecemeal” Pakistani purchasing efforts to acquire inverters were directly related to the building of a gas centrifuge unit for producing weapons-grade uranium. Attached to the cable is a 7 November "Memorandum for the Record" discussing sharing this information with the Department of Energy.

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.