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February 25, 1955

Abstract of Conversation: Chinese Premier Zhou receives Trevelyan

Zhou Enlai and Trevelyan debated on the nature of the Manila Treaty and its implications for the Geneva Agreement.They also discussed the issue of the Dai Autonomous Region between China and Thailand and the legal status of Taiwan.

November 3, 1964

Record of Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with British Minister President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay

Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.

September 5, 1963

Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with a Kenyan African National Federation Delegation (Excerpt)

Zhou Enlai criticizes the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, arguing that it signifies an attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to monopolize nuclear weapons. Enlai warns that the agreement will allow larger nuclear countries to commit “nuclear blackmail” against smaller, non-nuclear countries.

June 20, 1959

Letter from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Temporary Halt in Nuclear Assistance

The Soviet Central Committee informs their Chinese counterparts that, in light of the arms reduction talks taking place in Geneva, Soviet nuclear assistance must cease. The Chinese had requested a sample atomic bomb and technical data, but the Soviet feared that doing so would imperil the efforts of the socialist countries in Geneva.

April 4, 1958

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Zhou Enlai on the Prohibition of Nuclear Testing

Khrushchev writes to Zhou outlining the Soviet Union's argument for the need to halt the testing of atomic weapons, and urges the Chinese to support and agree to the ban.

February 28, 1958

Conversation of Mao Zedong with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin (Excerpt)

In a conversation with Soviet ambassador Yudin, Mao sees a prohibition of the use of hydrogen weapons as very likely, as the capitalist countries "[fear] fighting this kind of war." Further, he notes that the socialist countries have an advantage over Western ones in terms of conventional army size.

March 26, 1954

Molotov's Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

November 8, 1963

Conversation with Comrades Pimenov, Witek and Shicha on 27 October 1963

The Council of UDSSR Embassy Pimenov and the First Secretaries of the Polish and Czech Embassy discussed the problematic economic cooperation between North Korea and socialist countries, accusing North Korea of exploiting the help offered.

August 9, 1956

Note to the British Representative to China regarding the "Kashmir Princess" Aircraft Incident

Zhou Enlai expressed the dissatisfaction about the release of the detainees by the government of Hong Kong. He emphasized that before the case was resolved, the government of Hong Kong had the responsibility to investigate the incident and to report to the Chinese government.

January 1, 1950

Memorandum, Conversation of Mao and USSR Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin on 1 January 1950

Mao Zedong informs Roshchin that India and Burma had expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with China, and that the UK may follow suit. The Chinese position, Mao said, is to agree to negotiations if these governments renounced their ties with the Guomindang. Mao and Roshchin also discussed the military situation and the question of Japanese POWs. Mao did not the POWs right away because the Chinese legal system was not developed enough. He also informed Roshchin of his intention to curtain stay in the USSR.

Pagination