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July 15, 1971	Memorandum of Conversation between The First Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Republic and the Head of Delegation of Korean Worker’s Party on the 50th Anniversary of the Mongolian People’s Revolution Officials of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Korean Worker's Party discuss their mutual support for the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, obstacles presented by the U.S. and Japan, and perspectives on the Sino-Soviet split.
October 31, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba' The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.
November 2, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'The Problem of How to Express a Position on the Cuban-Soviet Relationship' A request from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba to the Foreign Ministry office, asking advice on the position they should take in regards to the complex Soivet-Cuban relationship. The embassy suggests China support the speech made by Castro on 1 November 1962, but that otherwise discussions of Soviet-Cuban relations should not be discussed at Chinese initiative.
November 2, 1962	Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, Information on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the defense department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College Further information from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the Defense Department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College, describing comments he made on the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
November 6, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Instruction on How to Express Positions Regarding the Cuba-Soviet Relationship' Instructions from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Cuba instructing them to indicate their support for Fidel Castro's November 1st speech, but advising "with respect to the Cuban-Soviet relationship, [you] should not speak but listen [zhiting bushuo]."
April 28, 1966	Report of the Panel on US Government Radio Broadcasting to the Communist Bloc Panel commissioned by the White House and comprised of Zbigniew Brzezinski, William E. Griffith, John S. Hays, and Richard S. Salant recommends continuation of RFE and RL as covertly funded objective news services, along with VOA and RIAS, discontinuation of public solicitation of private financial donations to RFE, and (Hays dissenting) establishing a Radio Free China
November 10, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, 'A Report of the Speech Given By the Chief Editor of the Soviet Weekly Za Rubezhom' On the 31st of October, the chief editor of the Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom delivered a report on current events in the Moscow Agriculture College. Regarding the Cuba problem and the Sino-Indian border problem.
October 14, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 59 Protocol 59 further details the focus of the Soviet Union just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was so confident that his plan with Cuba would go unhindered that he spent his efforts on resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict, thinking the matter with missiles was done.
October 11, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 58 Protocol 58 provides insight into what was occupying the mind of Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theme of the meeting was centered around the Sino-Indian conflict, questions surrounding the McMahon line, and the future of Tibet. With the focus on China and India, it is reasonable to assume that the crisis caught Khrushchev by surprise.
November 2, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.