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January 14, 1972

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.

February 1, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 19, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Lengthy report on India's current domestic and foreign policies. Includes discussion of India's upcoming parliamentary elections and preparations by Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress Party. Foreign relations in Asia with countries such as China, Cambodia, and Afghanistan are discussed, as well as India's involvement in disarmament talks through the Six Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative. Lastly, India's relationship with the Soviet Union in foreign policy and trade is described.

February 13, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 41, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on a recent Pakistani missile test based on information from an Indian official. India does not believe Benazir Bhutto's statement that Pakistan's nuclear program is peaceful. Includes speculation on China's involvement in the program. Pakistan has also approached contacts in Hungary about obtaining nuclear technology.

November 28, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 219, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on India's response to Pakistan's purchase of a nuclear reactor from China.

December 12, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 227, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on talks with the chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistan wants to purchase a nuclear power plant control system from Hungary.

July 6, 1976

Report, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

A lengthy report on the results of India Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union drawn from news sources and conversations with Indian officials. The response is described as highly positive with an expectation of closer political and economic cooperation between the two countries in the future.

July 17, 1954

From the Journal of Molotov: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, and Vietnamese Vice-Premier Pham Van Dong discuss various topics relevant to the Geneva Convention, including the construction of foreign military bases in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam, the establishment of regrouping zones in northeast Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina, and the possible formation of an international supervisory commission.

June 2007

An Illegal Trainer (KGB history of agent "Halef"). Folder 60. The Chekist Anthology.

Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.

December 27, 1979

Declaration of the CC CPSU to the Party Leadership concerning the Situation in Afghanistan, Attachment to CPSU Politburo Protocol #177

The CC CPSU states that the removal of N. M Taraki, and the rise of H. Amin to political leadership in Afghanistan bolstered counterrevolutionaries. The CC CPSU approved a small military force to stabilize the country, supporting the regional and international interests of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The message is sent to the Members and Candidate Members of the CC CPSU, the Members of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, the CC of the Communist Parties Of Union Republics, Kray Committees, and Oblast Committees of the Party, The Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, the Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU, and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Soviet Navy.

June 5, 1954

Minutes, Wang Bingnan’s Meeting with Jean Chauvel and Counselor to the French Delegation, Colonel Jacques Guillermaz

Wang and Chauvel discuss the armistice in Indochina. Wang presents China's ideas on the three part supervisory committee for the armistice. Chauvel suggests India, Burma, and Pakistan as examples of possible neutral nations to participate in the NNSC, and Wang supports the Soviet delegation's suggestions.

Pagination