Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

United States Soviet Union Cuba Clear All

Related Resources

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuban Foreign Relations

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Eastern Europe

Poland

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Kudryavtsev, Sergey Mikhailovich

1915- 1998

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Drozniak, Edward

-

Photograph of John F. Kennedy in 1963

Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South America

Brazil

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Milnikiel, Eugeniusz

-

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Eastern Europe

Hungary

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Fireworks over the closing ceremonies of the Seoul Olympics, 1988

1988 Seoul Olympic Games

Sino-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Results:

71 - 80 of 155

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

October 24, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 24 October 1962 On the Cuban Crisis situation, Jelen says that Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev is optimistic but Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto is concerned. Jelen also gives his own impressions of the crisis, saying that "There’s a relative run on the stores, but without any signs of panic and fears of the threat of military operations."
October 23, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962 In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.
October 20, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak) Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.
June 1, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 1 June 1962 Drozniak replies to Ogrodzinski regarding the information he received from from [Charles E. “Chip”] Bohlen that Cuba has been removed from the list of priorities of US foreign policy. Bohlen also confirms, through Drozniak, that the content of the talks between [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Soviet Ambassador Anatoly] Dobrynin. The Americans are assessing that the USSR is not currently in any hurry to resolve the issue of Berlin. When it comes to a next meeting [between the Americans and the Soviets], the US will wait for a Soviet initiative.
January 2, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 2 January 1962 There is an opinion among a small group of the heads of Latin American diplomatic posts that the US would push through the sanctions against Cuba, except for the military ones, as far as possible.
November 1, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962 Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.
November 19, 1962	Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt) Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”