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Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

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Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuban Foreign Relations

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

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Poland

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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Kudryavtsev, Sergey Mikhailovich

1915- 1998

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Drozniak, Edward

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Photograph of John F. Kennedy in 1963

Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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Milnikiel, Eugeniusz

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President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Fireworks over the closing ceremonies of the Seoul Olympics, 1988

1988 Seoul Olympic Games

Sino-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

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November 16, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66 Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
October 28, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63 According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.
October 27, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62 Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.
October 25, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 61 Protocol 61 indicates Khrushchev was already taking steps away from the crisis unfolding. Khrushchev decided that the ships carrying the IRBM missiles (the R-14s) on the high seas should turn around and come home.
October 23, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60 Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.
July 1, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39 Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.
November 2, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.
October 27, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."
October 23, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.
December 14, 1962	Mongolian Embassy in Moscow, Record of Conversation between the Mongolian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora Becerra Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow Luvsan and the visiting Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora make plans for future trade negotiations between Mongolia and Cuba. They also discuss the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the effect of the US embargo on Cuba's trade relations with Latin American countries and the sale of its sugar harvest.