The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 30 July 1990 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Japan, Liberia, Algeria, Togo, Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq and Israel.

Yudin recounts his meetings with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. In three meetings, Yudin learned more about China's relations with other communist parties in Asia, economic conditions in China, and developments in the Korean War.

Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported Indonesia’s intention to hold the Asian-African Conference, its attitude towards the Asian-African Conference, and the possible development of the Conference.

The agenda of the Bogor Conference was to determine the purposes, timing, and participants of the Asian-African Conference. The five Southeast Asian countries agreed that China and Japan should participate in the Asian-African Conference, but some countries also insisted on the participation of US allies such as Thailand and the Philippines.

The UK responded the decision of inviting China to attend the Asian-African Conference with anger, stating that countries in the Bogor Conference had wrong expectations toward China. The US feared that China would have great influence on the Asian-African Conference and thus weaken US influence in the region. The US and UK also worried that China’s participation would improve China-Japan relations. French press expressed this decision as the evidence of the failure of the US power in Southeast Asia.

Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong converse about the mediation talks between the CCP and the Guomindang, Yugoslavia, coordination between the communist parties of the Asian countries, and the history of the CCP.

The Department of International Trade estimated that the Asian-African Conference would be a good occasion to strengthen economic and trade relations with the participating countries. The Department of International Trade therefore made the recommendations to befriend with these former colonies for developing strong economic and political relations.

The Department of International Trade estimated that the Asian-African Conference would be a good occasion to strengthen economic and trade relations with the participating countries. The Department of International Trade therefore made the recommendations to befriend with these former colonies for developing strong economic and political relations. This is the modified version of the draft plan that was issued earlier.