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Documents

October 2, 1980

CPSU CC Politburo Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and Representatives, 'Carrying Out Additional Measures to Counter American-Chinese Military Cooperation'

Instructions to Soviet ambassadors discussing the growing military cooperation between China and the United States.

December 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States'

This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

October 1977

Letter from South African Prime Minister Vorster to US President Carter on US-South Africa Relations

South African Prime Minister Vorster denies the existence of a South African nuclear program and lists hostile steps taken by the United States to exclude South Africa from international nuclear and atomic energy groups. He concludes that "it would seem... the United States officially holds the view that stability in Southern Africa and the future of our country is to be sacrificed in the hope of stopping Soviet expansionism."

December 27, 1962

Bulgarian UN Representative Milko Tarabanov, Report to Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo on Disarmament Negotiations

UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session.

The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO).

Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

November 1, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

August 19, 1965

Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Vietnam 'Peace Talk' Activities"

The Chinese Foreign Ministry reports on overtures made by the United States toward initiating peace talks to end the Vietnam War. Many countries in such as Ghana, France, India and Yugoslavia are attempting to promote the talks, but China remains skeptical of these initiatives and opposed to opening talks.

February 17, 1984

Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

1983

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

March 9, 1972

State Department cable 40378 to US Embassy Ottawa, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

During a discussion with the Canadian embassy counselor, U.S. country desk director David Schneider opined that Indian was unlikely to test a device in the “near future” but he wanted Ottawa’s prognosis. Schneider was also interested in whether the Soviets, with their close relationship with India, might be able to use their influence to “deter” a test. If India tested, the U.S. could respond with a “strong statement,” but whether “punitive” measures would be taken would depend on whether the test “violated existing agreements.” In October 1970, the State Department had cautioned the Indians that a “peaceful nuclear explosion” was indistinguishable from a weapons test and that the test of a nuclear device would be incompatible with U.S.-Indian nuclear assistance agreements.

Pagination