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February 9, 1968

Directive Sent to Cde. Roshchin, Soviet Representative, Geneva

Politburo to the Soviet ambassador and representatives giving them language to use when discussing the American Air Force crash of a B-52 carrying hydrogen bombs in Greenland.

February 9, 1968

Decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for 9-12 February 1968, '11. On Our Steps in connection with the Accident of the American Bomber with Nuclear Weapons on Board and the Radioactive Contamination of the Environment...'

An outline of next steps the Politburo plans to take in response to the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash.

February 2, 1944

Memorandum of Conversation Held in the Kremlin, February 2, 1944, at 6 p.m.

W. Averell Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss the United States using Soviet Air Bases on the Pacific coast and the Soviets entering the Pacific fight.

October 23, 1947

Draft of Telegram to Vyshinsky on the Korean Question

Vyshinsky is instructed that, because the Korean issue is already on the UNSC agenda, it should remain there. Vyshinsky should stake out a position that both American and Soviet troops withdraw simultaneously, allowing the Koreans to develop a unified government. Elected representatives from both Koreas should be invited to discussions. A time span for the troop withdrawals must be set. The draft includes some scrawled recommendations from Stalin.

November 20, 1946

Cable No. 641, Dekanozov to Cde. Stalin

Dekanozov relates a conversation with Ambassador Smith, who indicated that President Truman was interested in control over nuclear energy. Smith would like to meet with Stalin when he returns from Sochi.

November 1948

Draft Directive on the Establishment of a Quota System for Atomic Production

A directive for the Soviet delegation, providing instructions and guidelines on handling a proposed quota system for atomic production. The Soviet position is that the quota is not useful unless a prohibition of atomic weapons occurs, in contrast to the Anglo-American opinion.

October 30, 1947

Telegram, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee.

October 29, 1947

Telegram Nos. 408-411, Vyshinsky to Molotov

Vyshinsky outlines the proceedings at the UN, where discussion of the Korean question and the withdrawal of Foreign troops from Korea has led the Soviets to insist that the Koreans be invited to the discussions. He details counter proposals from the Americans, and Soviet responses to these resolutions.

October 29, 1947

Telegram No. 293, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

Molotov writes that Vyshinsky must insist on the Koreans being invited to any discussion on removing foreign troops from Korea. If opposition to such participation holds, the Soviets should abstain from voting on the matter out of principle.

September 20, 1947

Ciphered Telegram, Molotov to Cde. Stalin

Molotov relates how the Americans have rejected the Soviet position toward establishing a temporary all Korean assembly. While there is some overlap between both positions, this issue has now been exacerbated by Marshall's move to decide it in the UNGA. The Soviets should respond to this move by reiterating their commitment to a self-determined form of government for Korea, which requires the Soviets and Americans to withdraw their troops.

Pagination