A representative of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports on his conversation with former Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar. Panikkar avowed that the Indian government firmly believes that Germany will eventually reunify, while it increasingly fears that Germany will unify by means of war, which would threaten India's own future development. Panikkar suggests that Nehru may discuss this issue in his upcoming meeting with Khrushchev.

Radhakrishnan discusses German unification with the President of West Germany, touches on India's independent stances on foreign policy issues in China, Japan, and Korea, and speaks at length about Russia's internal policies. Radhakrishnan summarizes a previous discussion with Stalin, in detail, discussing Soviet approaches to religion (compared with Indian approaches), and Stalin's strong denial of accusations of aggression: Radhakrishnan says that he is "convinced that Stalin and Russia are gripped by sincere fears of a Western attack." Radhakrisnan concludes by expressing his hope that Germany can unify.

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

This document offers an East German assessment of Romania's attitude towards China. It emphasizes that the Romanian Communist Party approves of the Chinese Maoist line and agrees with Beijing's domestic and foreign policies. Romania's foreign policy is said to attribute the same importance to relations with China as to relations with the Soviet Union. It also notes that the Romanian government has given more publicity to the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and West Germany than it did to similar moves between East Germany and India. The authors identify an anti-Soviet bias in the Romanian position, which the authors believe undermines the unity of the Socialist countries.

Hermann questioned Putiwtz on North Korea's foreign policy, including its relations with other socialist countries, Pakistan, and capitalist coutries while Putiwitz discussed economic cooperation and political relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea.

(Excerpts) Minutes of discussions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee concerning non-proliferation. The Romanian delegation argues against a joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact on non-proliferation for fear that it might be used against China. The other delegations argue that a joint declaration is necessary in order to prevent the creation of the Multilaterall Nuclear Force proposed by NATO.

Memorandum of conversations between Hungarian delegate to the UN with Soviet, Yugoslav and Romanian counterparts on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.