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"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

Great Britain

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

France

Nuclear Proliferation

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, 1971.

Brandt, Willy

1913- 1992

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański broadcasting for Radio Free Europe, 3 May 1952

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Berlin Wall between Mitte and Kreuzberg

Berlin Wall

Photograph of Gorbachev-Bush summit at Malta, 1989

End of the Cold War

Euromissiles Crisis

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

Official portrait for President George H.W. Bush, 1989.

Bush, George H.W.

1924- 2018

Photograph of Helmut Kohl, 1982.

Kohl, Helmut

1930- 2017

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

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Documents

December 1985	Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints' The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”
October 21, 1983	Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints' Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to US official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.
April 2, 1974	Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Uranium Enrichment' Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.
March 16, 1962	Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on the Federal Republic of Germany and Cuba Ambassador János Beck reports on diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Cuba. Beck speculates that FRG does intelligence work for departed Americans. Central to Beck’s report is the fact that Cuba wants to preserve diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible. Relevant is the Hallstein principle and the presence of FRG diplomats and German Democratic Republic’s Political Commission. (There are two self-governing and independent German states in Cuba.)
November 28, 1989	Decision About the Measures Regarding the Decision of the KGB Collegium of the USSR of 5 September 1989, 'About the Tasks of the State Security Services of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime' In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.
February 13, 1990	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, February 13, 1990, 1:49-2:00 p.m. EST Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Germany.
November 10, 1989	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor – Federal Republic of Germany, November 10, 1989, 3:29-3:47PM Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Germany.
October 23, 1989	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1989, 9:02-9:26 a.m. EDT Telephone conversation between President George H. W. Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the situation in Eastern Europe.
August 19, 1971	Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger Regarding the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin Rush updates National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the progress of the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin, informing him that the "bureaucrats [in the State Department] have been foiled" and an agreement has been completed and "it contains virtually everything we hoped to get under our maximum demands."
August 18, 1971	Cable from Secretary Rogers to Ambassador Rush on the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin Alarmed by the speed of the negotiations' progress, Secretary Rogers informs Ambassador Rush (and Henry Kissinger) that "an ad referendum agreement should not be reached at the present time."