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December 15, 1995	Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing' State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.
December 15, 1995	Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test' The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”
December 13, 1995	Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update – 19951213' Email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. According to this message, the cable at the test site had changed its shape again, from a thick cable to two smaller connected cables. The “Stemming pile” is a reference to the mound of dirt that would cover the test device once it had been placed in the hole. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.”
December 12, 1995	Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update' Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.
December 11, 1995	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test' Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Rao had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough “leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”
December 11, 1995	State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials' Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.
December 10, 1995	State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue' Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.
October 21, 1964	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade' This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”
April 23, 1964	Letter from Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone Noting new intelligence information on the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, as well as the possibility of developments concerning Sweden, Hughes requested McCone to initiate a new estimate of nuclear proliferation trends, which would eventually become part of a October 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Hughes enclosed draft “terms of reference,” that included questions about the possibility of “clandestine” weapons programs and new technological developments that could make weapons development “easier” (perhaps a reference to gas centrifuge technology that the 1964 NIE would discuss).
May 23, 1974	National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 on Nuclear Proliferation Following India’s nuclear weapon test, the US must reassess its nuclear non-proliferation policy and how best to deal with India in the future. The author of the memo determines that nuclear non-proliferation is still necessary and can be “effectively pursued.” The memo is followed by a series of documents outlining courses of action to help deter further proliferation.