A brief note suggests that the 12-page note sent to the Ministry by the North Korean Embassy in Prague should be returned as if never read. The 31 October 1967 North Korean note, introduced by a brief letter in English and provided both in French and in Korean, deals with U.S. imperialism and the risk of war it entails.

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

Boissevain writes about a conversation between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto. The conversation revolves around Castro's Five Points, and Roa claims they are not aimed at the United States but rather the Soviet Union whose concession to remove the missiles greatly disturbed Castro. The Brazilian Ambassador though the Cubans asked too much, while Roa said these points are negotiable.

Having read the Union Carbide and General Electric reports on gas centrifuges, and taking into account West Germany and The Netherlands’ unwillingness to classify their programs, the AEC looks into other courses of action, including collaboration with the other two nations and even declassifying their own program.

As West Germany and The Netherlands developed ultra-centrifuges without a classification policy, the AEC discuss ways to keep the technology under wraps without arousing suspicion from the other members of Euratom.

An outline of the Dutch position on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe as of late 1979. It includes extensive discussion of Dutch domestic political challenges associated with supporting TNF modernization, the proposed connection between TNF modernization and the fate of SALT II as well as an enumeration of military/technical conditions under which TNF modernization would be viewed as more palatable by the Dutch government.

A summary of points made during U.S.-Dutch discussions related to TNF. The Dutch will not oppose NATO’s plans, but only postpone its own decision. However, the Dutch will continue to register their reservations regarding the scope of modernization. The U.S. disagrees with a Dutch proposal to link TNF modernization with SALT II ratification and states that the Dutch should refrain from critiquing TNF modernization since it is postponing its own decision on the issue.

An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

Participants in the meeting included President Carter, Minister Vance, MP van Agt and also Min. Van der Klaauw, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, David Aaron, Tammenoms Bakker, and Merckelbach. Conversation revolves around TNF modernization and arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. Both parties discuss domestic difficulties shaping how these issues are presented and pursued.