This report describes the meeting between the Brazilian diplomat Carmen Moura and Lockheed’s representatives Kenneth Fisher and Noel Horn. The main issue discussed at the meeting was the feasibility of the creation of the joint venture between Lockheed, the Russian Kruchinev and the Brazilian group Monteiro Aranha. The venture would utilize American made satellites from Lockheed, satellite launch vehicles from Kruchinev and the Brazilian launching site at Alcântara Launch Center.

On April 1993, Brazilian diplomats met once more with Robert Einhorn, now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Chemical Weapons and Proliferation. Einhorn was mainly concerned with the delay in the approval of the export control legislation in Brazil and wondered if the issue was not losing priority in the Brazilian government’s agenda. He also tried to discourage the development of Brazilian SLV by arguing that it would not be economically advantageous for the country.

On September 14th-15th 1992, The Brazilian government received the US technical mission on strategic trade. Among the issues discussed during the meeting, the most important was Brazil’s export control legislation for sensitive goods and technologies, which was still to be voted on by the Brazilian Congress at the time.

This cable reports the meeting between Brazilian diplomat Sergio Amaral, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs, and Vahn H. Van Diepen, Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation. Eihorn made clear during the meeting that space programs such as Brazil’s are a source of concern for the US administration because it could use the same technology developed for the SLV to build ballistic missiles.

This cable shows Ambassador Ricúpero’s reaction to Brazil’s inclusion in the list of “validated license.” Ambassador Ricúpero recommended that President Fernando Collor express Brazilian disappointment with this decision in a letter to President George Bush.

This cable, sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Brasília, reports Brazil’s inclusion in the list of countries that might manufacture rockets. The inclusion was in the supplement number 6 section 778 of the “Export Administration Regulations.” The US administration’s report on the list also notes the importance of the Brazilian government’s recent steps towards non-proliferation and that its inclusion in the list is due to its rocket programs and the development of its SLV.

This cable reports the outcome of the visit made by the Missile Technology Control Regime's mission to Brazil headed by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Throughout the meeting, the Brazilian space program was described as the most sensitive issue in regard to the MTCR.

This letter sent by President Fernando Collor to President George H. W. Bush describes the importance of the first Brazilian made satellite to the country and communicates that the French-American consortium Orbital Sciences Corporation will probably be the enterprise chosen to put the Brazilian satellite in orbit. President Collor expected that this partnership paved the way for further cooperation in the space field and informed President Bush of his decision to create the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), under civilian control.

This is a letter written by Brazilian Congressman Herbert Levy which reveals the content of his meetings with high U.S. governmental officials regarding his concern about Argentina’s nuclear activities less than a year after the Falklands/Malvinas War. In these conversations, Levy states that Argentina might develop a nuclear artifact.

The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”