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May 31, 1986

Telegram by the Italian Embassy in Ottawa to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ''Ministerial Atlantic Council in Halifax - East West relationship / Problems related to SALT II'

Telegram from Italian Ambassador to Canada to the Foreign Ministry recounting the motives behind president Reagan's decision to abandon the SALT II treaty, as provided by Secretary of State George P. Schultz at at the Atlantic Council of Ministers.

November 30, 1972

Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Vienna to Deputy Minister Nicolae Ecobescu and Vice President of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy Ion Udrea

The Canadian Embassy in Beijing contacted the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the need to continue the IAEA inspections in Taiwan.

September 26, 1972

Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Vienna to Ion Voicu

The IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund feels obligated to inspect a Canadian reactor being installed in Taiwan as long as the IAEA agreements with Taiwan are still in force.

October 19, 1972

Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Vienna to Deputy Minister Nicolae Ecobescu and Vice President of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy Ion Udrea

The IAEA will carry out an inspection in Taiwan at the request of Canada, which is supplying a research reactor to Taiwan.

February 27, 1986

Brussels to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Zero Option and the Europeans'

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

February 19, 1986

Brussels–NATO (BNATO) to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: consultation within the alliance. As this dispatch from Brussels concluded, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, “NATO nuclear collective consultation is the worst form, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

February 17, 1986

Washington, DC to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: in consultation within the alliance. The Special Consultative Group was used as a forum to “air views of allies,” hold briefings on the current state of negotiations, and to share a new negotiating position right before it was tabled. Canadian officials also warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero.

October 16, 1945

TASS Digest Distributed to Cde. I.V. Stalin and Cde. C.M. Molotov, 'The Anti-Soviet Fabrications of a Mexican Newspaper; Etc.'

Summary of news reports from Mexico, Sweden, Canada, and Great Britain, most on Stalin's alleged illness.

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

Pagination