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Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Sino-Soviet Relations

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

The Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi, Vietnam, 2012.

Southeast Asia

Vietnam

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

North Korea-China friendship celebrated at the DPRK mass games

China-North Korea Relations

Trade agreement between European Economic Community and China

China-Europe Relations

Conversations with Zhou Enlai

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Conversations with Mao Zedong

Photograph fo Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing

China. Foreign Ministry

1949-

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Deng Xiaoping, 1979.

Deng, Xiaoping

1904- 1997

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June 4, 1946	Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to China A.A. Petrov with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shijie, 1 June 1946 Wang Shijie presented a draft of suggestions from the Chinese side about economic collaboration in Manchuria, as a proposal. This includes common mine excavations and the Chinese right to use Japanese enterprises in the former occupied Manchuria until the disagreement over the distribution of enemy property confiscated during the war was settled.
July 1991	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control' With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.
September 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Argentina: Seeking Nuclear Independence: An Intelligence Assessment' According to the 1985 report, the Argentines “have achieved at least a proof of principle of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion.” In other words, they had a workable system. Nevertheless, the enrichment plant would not be “fully operational until 1987-1988.” While the assessment of Argentine interest in nuclear weapons did not change, CIA analysts asserted that “Argentina continues to develop the necessary facilities and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons development effort.”
January 20, 1983	Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13/32-83, 'Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers' With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials.
December 7, 1979	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, Enclosing Report, 'A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program' With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. They had no hard evidence--and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations—so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.”
January 20, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation' This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
August 29, 1963	Hungarian Embassy in Sofia, Report on Bulgarian-Cuban Relations Hungarian Ambassador to Bulgaria Karoly Prath summarizes developments on Bulgarian-Cuban relations gathered from Hungarian-Bulgarian diplomatic contacts. Bulgarian-Cuban relations were not adversely effected by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The relationship is dominated by economic development (e.g. the expansion of trade, specialist exchanges, Bulgarian loans to Cuba, the root causes of Cuba's economic difficulties). Prath also discusses Bulgarian concerns over the influence of China on Cuba.
October 24, 1985	Telegram, Argentine Embassy in Brasilia, Brazil and China Deny Charges of Nuclear Proliferation Telegram from the Argentine Embassy in Brasilia reports on US Senator Alan Cranston’s claim that China was proliferating nuclear technology to countries like Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa. The telegram reports that both Brazil’s Foreign Ministry and China’s Embassy in Brasilia denied the charges. Part of the telegram is hand-highlighted , where a Brazilian diplomat says that the only deal between China and Brazil was the one signed by President Figueiredo during his visit to Beijing in 1984.
April 4, 1984	Memorandum, Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Brazil-PRC. Nuclear Energy' Memo from Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro to President João Batista Figueiredo on the current state of, and potential for the future of nuclear cooperation with China, in the follow-up to the presidential visit to Beijing. Guerreiro recalls that, since China was also not a party to the NPT, nuclear cooperation and purchase of material, like the uranium acquired in 1982, would not be subjected to full-scope safeguards, preserving the “sovereignty of Brazil’s nuclear program.” Guerreiro mentions a study by the National Security Council, the Nuclear Commission, Nuclebrás and the Foreign Ministry on the commercial and technological potential for an agreement with China, similar to the ones that Brazil had already signed with “other developing countries, namely those that are not members of the NPT.” One such agreement, Guerreiro suggests, could be signed during President Figueiredo’s upcoming visit to Beijing.
June 23, 1963	Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Görög), Report on Reactions to Fidel Castro’s Trip to the Soviet Union Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Erzsébet Görög writes a preliminary assessment of Castro’s state visit to the Soviet Union in 1963. Görög reports on improvements in Cuba’s party organization and positive reactions from the Cuban public and media on Castro’s visit. Görög notes different reactions to the visit between the economic/technical and artistic intelligentsia, adding that “Khrushchev managed to win Fidel over to his side in the Soviet-Chinese dispute.” Other topics include emigration and external counter-revolutionary activities.