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Documents

January 24, 1963

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Conflicts

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

December 5, 1962

Hungarian Legation in Washington (Radványi), Report on Mikoyan’s Visit to Washington

Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires János Radványi reports on Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to Washington, DC. After a brief description of Mikoyan’s Washington itinerary, the report is divided into three sections: Mikoyan’s impressions of his meetings with American officials, meetings in Cuba with Cuban officials, and meetings about different socialist countries (e.g. China, Hungary). Primary subjects discussed include the presence of missiles in Cuba, nuclear proliferation and Latin America as a nuclear free region, missile bases, and the Berlin issue.

November 30, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Cuban–Soviet Divergence

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on Cuban-Soviet divergence after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba’s divergence includes other socialist countries, while preserving a special relationship with Czechoslovakia. Beck offers criticism of Cuba’s leadership, politics, and independent stance, but along with the Soviet Union reinforces that Cuba is true to the revolution.

November 29, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Divergence

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on the Soviet-Cuban divergence after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Provided with information by the Polish ambassador, Beck believes that the Cubans and Soviets had a strategic plan in placing missiles in Cuba, but the US reaction was more drastic than expected. Beck summarized facts about the crisis from 27-28 October and explains that the Cubans feel betrayed by the Soviet Union and their negotiations with the US.

January 18, 1952

Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin with Chinese Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing, 24 December 1951

In the course of the discussion the matter of the proposed purge by the Chinese government of foreigners in Manchuria was raised. Luo Ruiqing said that the Chinese government intends to purge a series of regions of the country of unreliable elements: Manchuria, Qingdao, and Beijing. In the course of two years from these regions all foreigners of imperialist states will be deported. It’s more difficult to address the matter of local Soviet citizens. Among these local Soviet citizens there are dispersed columns of openly and secretly hostile elements, who have conducted in the past or carry on now espionage activities against the USSR and the Chinese People’s Republic.

May 6, 1946

From the Diary of V.M. Molotov, Reception of the Chinese Ambassador to France, Jing Tai, on 6 May 1946 at 3:00 p.m. in the Soviet Embassy in Paris

The conversation is concerning the "German question" in terms of the conditions and aftermath of the surrender. PR China sees the negotiation on Germany as becoming an agreement that might apply similar to the question on the Japanese surrender. For this reason Jing Tai asks Molotov to allow China to take part in the negotiations on Germany. The trials of Japanese war criminals were also discussed.

November 12, 1962

Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

October 25, 1962

Minutes of the Meeting of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker’s and Peasant’s Government (Council of Ministers)

The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.

October 23, 1962

Soviet Marshal Andrei Grechko, Commander of the Warsaw Pact, telegram to Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege

Major Golovány writes to Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Zzineage and proposes the Hungarian military prepare for combat readiness in response to the President Kennedy’s increasing provocation towards Cuba.

October 16, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Görög), Report on Cuban President Dorticos’ Trip to New York

Chargé d’Affaires ad Interim Erzsébet Görög reports on Cuban President Dorticos’s trip to New York and speak at the United Nations. Görög opens her report describing the Cuban delegations travel from Havana to New York—she adds that the confusion may have been planned for political purposes. Görög records her impressions of Dorticos’s speech and the Cuban public’s receipt of the Cuban delegation upon return.

Pagination