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July 3, 1972	From the Journal of Y.D. Fadeev, 'Record of Conversation between I.T. Novikov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, 28 June 1972' Novikov and Kim Il Sung discuss the DPRK’s trade and economy, emphasizing the increasing cooperation among the socialist countries through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). In addition, Kim Il Sung mentions that the North has secret contacts in South Korea in order to gain a better understanding of the internal situation in Seoul.
July 6, 1972	From the Journal of N.G. Sudarikov, 'Record Of A Conversation with Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, 19 June 1972' Kim Il Sung expresses satisfaction toward Brezhnev’s positions regarding Korea and Vietnam which were made during talks with U.S. President Nixon. Kim also criticizes Park Chung Hee for suppressing the opposition in South Korea, including the imprisonment of Kim Dae-jung.
May 15, 1972	From the Journal of N.G. Sudarikov, 'Record of a Conversation with Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, 9 May 1972' Kim Il Sung credits the diplomatic achievements and economic development of North Korea for creating greater opposition and chaos in South Korea. He also broaches how the two Koreas have different opinions on family reunions.
November 9, 1944	Letter No. 402 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King The Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L.D. Wilgress, thoroughly reviews Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Asia, and in Latin America and its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Wilgress optimistically concludes that "the Soviet Government are desirous of co-operating fully with the other great powers."
May 29, 1988	Memorandum of Conversation, the President's First One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev Reagan and Gorbachev's first conversation during Reagan's 1988 visit to Moscow.
August 14, 1967	Intelligence Note 669 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Tests of Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)' Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.
April 21, 1967	Research Memorandum RSB-46 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Policy on Nonproliferation Moves in Two Directions' Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.
April 12, 1967	Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'Soviets Continue to Denounce American Interpretation of Nonproliferation Treaty' The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.
October 13, 1965	Research Memorandum RSB-115 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Views of Nuclear Sharing and Nonproliferation' INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”
September 29, 1965	Research Memorandum RSB-106 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Conditions about Western Nuclear Arrangements for a Nondissemination Treaty' INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”