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Documents

January 1987

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in January 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

December 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in December 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

October 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in October 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

September 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in September 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

August 1986

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in August 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

September 23, 1977

State Department telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment'

This document describes the progress made up to that point and the various concerns of countries within the group regarding the scale of safeguards, particularly from the French and Germans. The NSG also agreed to make the guidelines available to the IAEA so that it could publish them. The State Department had been reluctant to publish them, not least because they did not include full scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third World concerns about a “secret cartel.”

September 15, 1977

State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document reflects that while full-scope safeguards had wide support in the group, both the French and the West German remained opposed. The Carter administration tried to persuade the French but they were worried about being "isolated" in the group and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had “fully achieved” its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group’s future was plainly uncertain.

May 3, 1977

State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977'

This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.

November 12, 1976

London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, 'London Nuclear Suppliers’ Meeting, November 11 – 12'

This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.

June 11, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

Pagination