Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

Pakistan Clear All

Related Resources

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South Asia

Pakistan

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Pakistani Nuclear History

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Nuclear Proliferation

China and South Asia

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South Asia

Afghanistan

Indian Nuclear History

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Pakistan. Embassy (China)

-

Bandung Conference 1955

Bandung Conference, 1955

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Pervez, Arshad Z.

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

China. Embassy (Pakistan)

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad

-

Conversations with Zhou Enlai

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State

-

Results:

161 - 170 of 321

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

February 22, 1988	Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with US Secretary of State G. Shultz Gorbachev and Shultz discuss issues in the Middle East, including the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War.
February 11, 1988	Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with Indian Minister of Defense Krishna Chandra Pant Gorbachev and Pant discuss Soviet and Indian foreign relations and the situation in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan.
February 27, 1987	Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti (Excerpt) Gorbachev and Andreotti discuss issues in the Middle East, including Soviet plans in Afghanistan and a possible international conference on the Middle East.
August 22, 1960	Memorandum of Conversation Between Deputy Minister Geng and Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan Abdur Rahman Khan at Ambassador Khan’s Banquet for Vice Premier Chen Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan Khan and Chinese Deputy Minister Geng discuss Sino-Afghani trade, Sino-Pakistani relations, and the status of Pakistani and Chinese nationals in Indonesia. While both officials express hope that Sino-Pakistani relations will improve and any Sino-Pakistani border issues will soon be resolved, Geng expresses his displeasure with Pakistan's long-standing opposition to the restoration of China's seat at the UN.
July 25, 1959	Deputy Department Director He Ying Receives Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires Suleman and Discusses Matters Related to Sino-Pakistani Relations He Ying and Suleman discuss the visit of a Chinese Muslim delegation from Taiwan to Pakistan and the state of Sino-Pakistani relations more generally.
July 1991	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control' With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.
February 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective' For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.
November 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Research Paper, 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations' This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.
December 1982	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States' This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”
July 1982	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987' With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.