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Aerial view of National Mall

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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

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Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Japan's Itsukushima Shrine

East Asia

Japan

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański broadcasting for Radio Free Europe, 3 May 1952

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Nuclear Proliferation

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

Sino-Soviet Relations

A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Cuban Foreign Relations

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United States. Department of State

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Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

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Documents

June 22, 1954	Cable from Zhou Enlai, 'Premier’s Intentions and Plans to Visit India' Zhou Enlai informed the Chinese government that his purposes of visiting India were to prepare the signing of an Asian peace and to build peace in the Indochina area. He also stated his plans regarding the negotiations of several treaties. The Chinese government agreed with his plans.
June 28, 1954	Record of the First Meeting between Premier Zhou and Prime Minister U Nu Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.
September 4, 1954	Chinese Foreign Ministry Intelligence Department Report on the Asian-African Conference The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported Indonesia’s intention to hold the Asian-African Conference, its attitude towards the Asian-African Conference, and the possible development of the Conference.
December 15, 1954	Report from the Asia Section, Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'On the Asian-African Conference' The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that Indonesia’s intention to hold the Asian-African Conference was to establish a neutral, third group to counter the US and the Soviet Union. It also reported the attitudes of the invited countries and the reactions of the Western countries toward the Conference. It concluded that it would be beneficial for China to participate in the Conference and to influence the political situation in the Conference.
December 29, 1954	Cable from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intelligence Department, 'The Agenda of the Five Southeast Asian Countries from the Bogor Conference and the Five Countries’ Attitudes towards China’s Participation in the Afro-Asian Conference ' The agenda of the Bogor Conference was to determine the purposes, timing, and participants of the Asian-African Conference. The five Southeast Asian countries agreed that China and Japan should participate in the Asian-African Conference, but some countries also insisted on the participation of US allies such as Thailand and the Philippines.
February 29, 1980	Report on the Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the Socialist Countries in Moscow, 26 February 1980 This document explains the views of the cooperating Socialist countries relating to Afghanistan. The USSR perceived the US attempt to line up NATO support against the Soviets as an aggressive action, designed to counter Soviet influence. The Soviets, by contrast, viewed their involvement in Afghanistan as increasing their sphere of influence around the Warsaw-pact countries, making such actions defense, rather than offensive. The USSR's leadership states that it should increase its ties to NATO countries to counteract the foreign policy of the US.
August 24, 1981	Soviet position on the Declaration of the Afghan Government This statement demonstrates the DRA's focus to participate in international affairs. The DRA commits itself to the policy of non-alignment, while discussing possible settlements of the situation in Afghanistan which involve the United Nations.
1980	Soviet briefing on the correspondence between Tito and Brezhnev This document reveals correspondence between Brezhnev and Tito. Tito expresses his worries about international politics relating to NATO's decision regarding long/medium range missiles, and advocates for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Brezhnev emphasizes the ideological and pragmatic importance of Soviet involvement in the Middle East, and discusses the role of NATO in Europe.
1980	Soviet briefing on the need to counter-balance Yugoslav endeavors concerning the Afghan question in the non-aligned countries This document provides an assessment of Yugoslavia’s policy regarding non-aligned countries. The Soviet Union analyses how to counter-balance the non-alignment movement with its foreign policy. The topic of non-interference in internal political matters, and the opinion of Ghana, Kuwait, and India regarding Soviet involvement in Afghanistan are discussed.
September 2, 1968	Note on the US credit extended to Poland Note from the Vice-President of the Romanian Council of Ministers Manea Manescu to Secretary General of the CC RCP Nicolae Ceausescu on Washington’s decision to extend a 500 million USD credit to Poland, to be repaid in 25 years. The note discusses the terms of the credit and the repayment policy, as well as the consequences of the credit on the Polish economy.