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May 16, 1969

Note Number 399 from Pierre Cerles to Michel Debré, 'China and Eastern Europe'

Pierre Cerles provides an assessment of Chinese foreign policy toward Eastern Europe during the 1960s within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Cultural Revolution, and China's own internal leadership divisions.

April 25, 1969

Telegram Number 1797/1800, 'Chinese Foreign Policy'

The French Ambassador to London reports that China is eager to open up diplomatic relations with Italy and Canada and to enter into negotiations with the United States.

October 29, 1968

Telegram Number 5186/92, 'Chinese Foreign Policy'

Relying on British assessments of the situation in China, the French Ambassador in London reports that Chinese foreign policy is the outcome of debates between anti-Soviets and anti-Americans within the CCP.

September 3, 1968

Note Number 291 from the Department of Asia-Oceania, 'China and the Events in Czechoslovakia'

The Department of Asia-Oceania analyzes shifts in Chinese foreign policy toward Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and connects the apparent changes in Beijing's diplomacy to the Sino-Soviet split and the Vietnam War.

December 7, 1988

Address by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN General Assembly Session (Excerpts)

Excerpts from an address by Gorbachev at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly Session. Gorbachev announced major cuts to the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and along the Chinese border.

January 28, 1970

Telegram from Indian Embassy in China on Sino-Soviet Border Negotiations

The India embassy in Beijing reports on recent developments in the Sino-Soviet border negotiations. The lead Soviet negotiator, Kuznetsov, had become increasingly open about the progress of the ongoing talks due to political maneuvering by China. The negotiator claimed that "the talks have not progressed because the Chinese have adopted a [sic] uncompromising attitude on reaching agreement on maintenance of [the] status quo."

May 13, 1950

Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

The telegram relays a request from Mao, conveyed via Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, seeking Stalin’s “personal clarifications” of his stand on a potential North Korean action to reunify the country. Mao sought the information after hearing a report from Kim, who had arrived that day in the Chinese capital for a secret two-day visit and clearly claimed that he had received Stalin’s blessing.

May 14, 1950

Ciphered Telegram No. 8600, Vyshinsky to Mao Zedong

The cable contains Stalin’s personal response to Mao's 13 May telegram. Using the code-name “Filippov,” Stalin confirms his agreement with the North Korean proposal to “move toward reunification,” contingent on Beijing’s agreement.

November 6, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 10:30 a.m., Tuesday

Pinto calls to attention the rude and violent tone of the proclamations of support to Cuba on the part of China contrasting with the relative moderation of the USSR and of its satellites. Pinto believes Mao is "taking a shot" at Khrushchev.

October 31, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba'

The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.

Pagination