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March 4, 1954

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Van Fleet

President Rhee once again suggests that the US government should increase the ROK defense forces. It will not only be cheaper to fund Korean (over American) divisions, it also means that Americans do not need to fight in Korea. Rhee then negotiates that if the US government implements the necessary military buildup aid, he too will not take any “unilateral action” for or against the future Geneva Conference until after it has been in session. Finally, Rhee advocates his disapproval of US interest to build up Japan.

May 3, 1951

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Coulter

President Rhee writes to General Coulter to address the issue of prisoners of war. After stating that releasing POWs would “demoralize” Korean soldiers, Rhee expresses his concern for POWs forced to fight in the North’s side. Rhee states that “democratic-accepting” POWs can be released only after they pass a series of tests proving them to be anti-communist. Once released, these POWs can “carry their stories of fair treatment under a democratic United Nations.”

September 13, 1981

Protocol No. 002/81 of the Meeting of the Committee for the Defense of the Homeland

Meeting of the Committee for the Defense of the Homeland on the implementation of martial law in Poland. Committee members discuss where to increase militarization to be prepared for martial law, and how best to protect martial law through propaganda.

May 13, 1969

Telegram from Romanian Ambassador in Beijing Aurel Duma to Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu Regarding Conversations with Representatives of Chinese Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs, and Defense

Telegram from Romanian Ambassador to China, Duma, to Romanian Foreign Minister, Manescu, focusing on Duma's talks with China's Deputy Foreign Minister, Guanhua. Guanhua sees the USSR's building of relations with Mongolia and the DPRK as an attempt to encircle China. He also believes that American and Soviet aid are what is keeping anti-Chinese propaganda in circulation in India, although the Kashmir issue means there is no need to fear an Indo-Pakistani alliance. Additionally, he notes the anti-Chinese sentiment apparent in the European socialist bloc countries, and asserts that, although it wishes no harm to the Israeli people, China does not recognize Israel as a legitimate state.

September 22, 1969

Stenographic Record of Meeting of Khabarovsk Regional and City Party Officials

Stenographic records of a meeting of Soviet Communist Party officials and activists in the regions bordering the People’s Republic of China. They respond to news of the meeting between Aleksei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai in Beijing on 11 September1969. Although they all applauded Kosygin’s meeting with Zhou, some speakers noted that little change in the border situation had been observed since their encounter eleven days before. Relations along the border remained tense with regular incursions from Chinese citizens into Soviet territory.

February 2, 1953

Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to China A.S. Paniushkin with the Chair of the City People’s Government in Beijing, Peng Zhen, 6 January 1953

Peng Zhen talked about the great significance for China of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Regarding difficulties that the CCP struggled with in the first year after the formation of the PRC, Peng Zhen said that at that time the party needed to carry on significant work regarding the ideological reeducation of a significant part of the intelligentsia, which incorrectly understood the role and significance of the Soviet Union in the matter of the victory of the revolution in China.

January 14, 1975

Note from GDR Embassy in Pyongyang to Comrade Liebermann

Everhartz summarizes remarks made by the Soviet Ambassador Gleb Aleksandrovich on Sino-DPRK relations and what the USSR ought to do to further their interests in North Korea.

April 18, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76137, TOP SECRET, April 18, 1967

The remarks of a Vietnamese diplomat on the incidents between South and North Korea, who explains that the South and North exploit tensions for their own political agendas.

April 7, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.14.213, TOP SECRET, April 7, 1967

Ionescu Teofil and the Chinese counselor in Pyongyang discuss the "great revolutionary event" in North Korea and the state of play in Sino-North Korean relations.

March 28, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.108, TOP SECRET, March 28, 1967

Ionescu Teofil and the Soviet Minister-Counselor in Pyongyang discuss the reasoning behind the "forthcoming revolutionary event" in North Korea, commenting that the event is likely to be way of distracting the public from economic problems and failures.

Pagination