The document briefly describes the US and Soviet views on the question of SRINF reductions, and discusses the German concerns about the process.

A brief report by US Ambassador Glitman regarding the INF negotiations with the USSR. There is an increased willingness to negotiate, and the parties have come closer in some aspects, but major differences still persist.

A short (untitled) document that summarizes the topics addressed in the Italo-Soviet talks in Lisbon and re-caps the key positions adopted by the two parties.

After the installation of INF in Western Europe, NATO's focus has returned to the issue of burden sharing. The US has demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the European contribution, and pressure to strengthen European defense is mounting.

This report is part of a wide documentation prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the meeting of the Atlantic Council in Brussels in December 1983. A central theme is the installation of the INF in Western Europe and the consequent interruption of the INF treaty negotiations in Geneva by the USSR.

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: consultation within the alliance. As this dispatch from Brussels concluded, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, “NATO nuclear collective consultation is the worst form, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: in consultation within the alliance. The Special Consultative Group was used as a forum to “air views of allies,” hold briefings on the current state of negotiations, and to share a new negotiating position right before it was tabled. Canadian officials also warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero.

A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”

In response to the arming of West Germany, Rapacki proposes a European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.