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Documents

October 10, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Trade relations with North Korea'

Recalls a conversation with Heldring of the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion, during which Heldring said he had received word from the North Koreans that they were willing to sign the proposed agreement even though they kept urging the establishment of a permanent trade mission. Heldring pointed out such a mission had recently been established in Switzerland and similar contacts were ongoing in the Scandinavian countries. The Dutch company VMF had, however, by now changed to a much more cautious position because of its South Korean interests. Heldring was putting of a reciprocal visit to North Korea until he knew the Ministry's position.

August 1, 1969

Note, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North Korea's Efforts to Establish Trade Missions in Western Europe (in English)

The note points out the North Korean mission in Paris (since 1968) and the intent of both the Swiss and the Austrians to establish similar missions soon. It mentions the drying up of significant communist loans as a motivation for Pyongyang's increasingly Western economic orientation, particularly through machine and equipment import.

August 13, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Relations with North Korea'

Memorizes a visit by the director of Shell in the Netherlands who reported a message from his colleague in Seoul that establishment of a permanent trade representation by North Korea in the Netherlands would cause significant harm to Shell's operations in South Korea. The Ministry informed him of the talks with the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion and called the issue "entirely open".

June 30, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Relations with North Korea'

Memo on a visit by Heldring and Kroese, of the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion, during which a draft agreement with their North Korean counterpart was discussed. Despite some specific objections the agreement in principle was acceptable to the Ministry. (The draft is the first attachment; other materials supplied for comparison by Heldring comprise the second attachment.)

June 6, 1974

Cable from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Berlin, 'Netherlands - North Korea'

The uncooperative attitude of North Korea re admission of both Koreas to the U.N. has disappointed the Dutch. Furthermore, general Communist refusal to recognize South Korea makes progress presently impossible.

June 3, 1974

Cable from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Vienna, 'North Korea'

The Minister requests confirmation of Austria's rumored intent to engage in official relations with Pyongyang.

May 31, 1974

Cable from Dutch Embassy in East-Berlin to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Netherlands - North Korea'

Reinink reports on being approached by the North Korean Ambassador on how to improve relations. The latter also mentioned Austria was about to engage in official relations; Reinink gave a noncommittal response.

March 1, 1974

Handwritten Note, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Minister's standpoint re recognition of North Korea'

The Minister in principle supports recognition of North Korea but wants to delay it because of lack of Communist reciprocity re South Korea.

August 29, 1973

Internal memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

A memorandum on North Korea’s claim to be the sole legal representative of Korea in the context of the United Nations.

July 4, 1973

Internal Memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The UN and North Korea'

The memorandum notes the Minister's intent to recognize North Korea no later than year's end, if possible. It agrees with the suggestion made in a departmental study that confidential consultations with those countries most involved would be good to get rid of UNCURK and the attached UN Command. It does note that (1) recognition should be postponed until some kind of basic agreement between the Koreas has come about; (2) getting rid of UN Command would create a difficult situation for those American troops still present, which should be addressed.

Pagination