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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Mitrokhin, Vasili

1922- 2004

Mitrokhin Archive

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Intelligence Operations in the Cold War

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Eastern Europe

Czechoslovakia

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

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Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich

1914- 1984

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Eastern Europe

Vassiliev Notebooks

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Vassiliev, Alexander

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Mielke, Erich

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Journalist informer

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Soviet Foreign Policy

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Soviet Union. Communist Party. Central Committee (CPSU CC). Politburo

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Sino-Soviet Relations

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Documents

February 23, 1954	From the Journal of Ambassador Pavel Yudin: Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong, 4 January 1954 A memorandum of conversation between Mao Zedong and Pavel Yudin. Yudin informs Mao about the Soviet "uncovering" of Lavrentii Beria's espionage. Mao thanks for the information and notes that it will be highly useful for China. He hints that the political atmosphere in the CCP had been "unhealthy" as some people have tried to use others' mistakes to undermine their reputation. In this connection, Mao refers to Zhang Guotao as a Guomindang spy, and also speculates that Wang Ming may have been recruited by the Guomindang as early as 1930.
1961	Intelligence Report on Counterintelligence Interactions with Great Britain and Israel A report on the progress of agent recruitment.
April 1, 1982	Report from Gen. G. Anachkov on Counterintelligence Work Against US Intelligence Activity
July 25, 1983	Information from Gen. G. Anachkov on Albanian intelligence Officers’ Recruitment of Agents in Bulgaria
December 8, 1978	Cooperative plan between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB of the Soviet Union from the summer of 1979-1981 The parties agree to assist one another in the collection of intelligence information on political, economic, scientific and technical matters and exchange information on suspicious contacts of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens suspected to be spies or subversive. Both agree to the exchange of counter-intelligence regarding Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens working in scientific organizations and international exhibitions, fairs and congresses. Steps are outlined to protect railroad cargo using troops from Warsaw Pact states, prevent eavesdropping of telecommunications and detect and prevent foreign terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak and Soviet airplanes and anti-socialist interruption of international trucking lines. Special mention is made of multiple international transportation organizations that need to be monitored. Information-sharing procedures are agreed to for commercial and industrial firms, banks, scientific centers and international scientific organizations.
March 22, 1979	Protocol on cooperation between the Interior Ministries of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union for the year 1979 The two parties agree to worker, including Interior Ministry officials and university students, exchanges in the field of academia, law, politics, criminal investigation, fire-fighting, engineering, external relations, science and public safety. Provisions are made of the exchange of documents relating to criminology, public safety, the Soviet military, politics and fire-fighting techniques. Both parties agree to exchange information on thefts of shipments, detection and prevention of anti-state activity in border regions and the protection of public order.
June 2007	Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations. Folder 80. The Chekist Anthology. This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.
November 17, 1967	Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.
June 2007	National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. Folder 53. The Chekist Anthology In this entry Vasili Mitrokhin expresses the KGB concerns regarding the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists’ (NTS) anti-socialist activities held in the Soviet Union and in the West. Mitrokhin states that the KGB had the task of taking control of NTS’ activities as well as destroing their reputation and connections with other anti-Soviet organizations. In order to paralyze the NTS, the KGB’s fundamental goal was to establish strong connections with the organization by sending undercover agents. Toward the end of 1963, the NTS became familiar with the presence of KGB agents among their members. KGB’s main goal was to create an illusion that the NTS was ruled by the KGB, which would help to make America and the West to distrust the organization. According to Mitrokhin, taking over the NTS’s publication “The Posev” was important as well. Mitrokhin provides a KGB plan to overturn the publication and he also attaches the list of all KGB agents who were involved in this undertaking, including their short biographies and codenames.
June 2007	The Cheka Emergence. Folder 96. The Chekist Anthology In this entry Mitrokhin provides a history of the Cheka’s creation and its missions in Europe between 1918 and 1925.