In his note to the CPSU CC, Gromyko writes that the Soviet MFA should reach out to Pope Paul VI about supporting the NPT. As the Pope has spoken out against the arms race before, Gromyko is optimistic that the treaty will gain support from the Vatican. This would exert influence on other Catholic countries to support the treaty as well.

This document contains instructions to the Soviet ambassador to meet with the Deputy Secretary of State of the Vatican and notify him of confidential information that needs to be brought to Pope Paul VI. In light of mutual understanding between the Vatican and the USSR on the importance of nuclear disarmament, the ambassador is requested to ask the Pope to utilize any diplomatic means at his disposal to help bring about the quickest possible conclusion to the NPT negotiations.

The telegram provides a summary of the presentation by General Abrahamson, the director of the Strategic Defense Initiative. General Abrahamson offers an overview of recent developments and appears optimistic about the future of the SDI.

Nitze's brief commentary on the developments in the recent negotiations with the USSR regarding arms reductions.

This rather technical document compares the strategic capabilities (conventional and nuclear) of Warsaw Pact and NATO. The document notes that Warsaw Pact has considerably increased its capabilities catching up with the West, and raises the question about Soviet intentions, and whether continuing armament is in line with peaceful coexistence.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

Memorandum of an extended one-on-one conversation between the Dutch and Italian Prime Ministers focusing in particular on a description of the reasons for Italy's strong support for TNF modernization as outlined by Cossiga.

A conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor Aaron in which Aaron outlines and defends the United States' views of the Netherlands' position on TNF modernization.