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Documents

September 1, 1971

GDR Embassy in Bucharest, 'Evaluation on the Visit of the Chinese Military Delegation in the RSR from August 22 to August 31, 1971’

This document describes the visit of a Chinese military delegation to Romania. According to the East German view, this visit is evidence of Chinese efforts to exert influence in the Balkans. China is said to support the nationalist position of the Romanian Communist Party and to encourage it to continue its politics. The evaluation submitted by the East German embassy concludes that Romania wishes to maintain an equilibrium in simultaneously sustaining relations with China and the Soviet Union.

May 8, 1973

Czechoslovak Record of Consultation of Eastern European Ambassadors in Beijing on the Situation in China

This document argues that Chinese policy is determined by a negative attitude towards the Soviet Union, political campaigns, and persecution of the domestic opposition. The participants of the meeting identify two political blocs struggling for political power in China, and state that the role of the army to date remains unclear.

October 14, 1959

From the Journal of Ambassador S.F. Antonov, Summary of a Conversation with the Chairman of the CC CPC Mao Zedong

October 1959 conversation between Mao Zedong and the Soviet diplomat and sinologist S.F. Antonov, in which Mao attempted to reassure the Soviets that China would not provoke war with the United States or with its Asian neighbors. In his conversation with Antonov, Mao attempts to lessen the impact of China’s displeasure with Soviet policies. He tries hard to show his agreement with Moscow on every issue—the United States, Taiwan, India, Tibet, disarmament.

December 12, 1950

Report from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

Zhou Enlai sends detailed reports to Mao Zedong on new recruits from the Northeast; the replenishment of military supplies; the distribution of Soviet infantry weapons; the repair of railways and transportation; the condition of airports in North Korea; the use of artillery and tank units; and the stationing of command posts.

December 9, 1950

Letter, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

Zhou Enlai asks for Mao Zedong's instructions on whether to attack Seoul in January or postpone the attack until March, and gives details on the benefits of postponing the attack.

December 9, 1950

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

Zhou Enlai reports to Mao Zedong on his talk with Zakharov about their strategic intentions and plans to cross the 38th parallel. Zakharov insists that one army should be moved to the Wonsan area to cover the southward-advancing flank, despite Zhou's disagreement with this move.

December 8, 1950

Draft Agreement by the Party Central Committee on Establishing a Sino-North Korea Joint Headquarters

The agreement establishes a Joint Headquarters between the Chinese and North Korean sides that will command the North Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and all guerrilla forces, and details the leadership and specific powers and operations of the Joint Headquarters.

December 3, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.

November 8, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Chai Junwu, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang

Zhou Enlai attempts to arrange a meeting between Kim Il Sung and two Chinese leaders, Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, to discuss military operations and arrangements.

November 8, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Chai Junwu

Zhou Enlai gives instructions on advising Kim Il Sung to remain optimistic and publicize the Chinese People's volunteer Army's involvement in the Korean War, stating that the opposing side is not prepared for a protracted war and thus is prone to panic.

Pagination