Mao argues that Europe remains the strategic center of US-Soviet conflict.

A cable from Ambassador Pauls about a conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua about developments in Europe and the Chinese assessment of the global situation after the end of the Vietnam War.

West German Ambassador Wickert reports to the Foreign Office about Chinese foreign policy following Mao Zedong's death.

This report, issued after the seventh Interkit meeting in Budapest, addresses unsolved socio-economic problems and internal party disputes in China. The new military strategy of the People's Republic as well as its economic development are examined. Beijing's foreign relations with Western countries, especially with the US, are considered to be detrimental to international détente. The attendees condemn China for stockpiling nuclear weapons and missiles in preparation for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, for extending its influence in developing countries, for strengthening the position of NATO, for interfering with the domestic policies of Vietnam, and for supporting the military junta in Chile.

This study addresses aspects of Chinese domestic and foreign policies after the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Internal party disputes and undemocratic structures are said to characterize the Chinese leadership. The document offers an analysis of the socio-political state of affairs in China and states that the delay in economic growth is due to violations of the economic principles of Socialism. As far as its foreign policy is concerned, China is strengthening its military potential; Beijing's intensified relations with Western countries are condemned.

This is a report on a visit by Clement Attlee's Labor Party delegation to China in August 1954. The report covers wide ground, summarizing the delegates' experiences and views on events in China, and contains a short account of Attlee's conversation with Mao Zedong. Mao and Attlee disagreed about the Soviet Union's policy towards Eastern Europe, and Mao, after defending the Soviet record, in the end admitted that he simply did not know enough about the situation in Eastern Europe. There was also some discussion of Taiwan, though Attlee was given the impression that China would not attack Taiwan for at least 10 years. There is also an interesting quote: "The delegation... received or were confirmed in the impression that the Chinese Government was... living in a world of delusions. The state had been reached where the Central People's Government viewed the outside world not as it was but according to how they thought it should be."

This document examines Chinese attempts to foster Western European integration as a counterbalance to the US. Also discussed is the relationship between NATO countries and China and its impact on Soviet-Sino relations, military cooperation between China and Western Europe, and the relations between China and West Germany.

This document contains information prepared by the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on China's European policy and Chinese opposition to the convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It states that China's overall goals are diametrically opposed to those of the European Socialist countries and their Communist parties, with Beijing identifying the Soviet Union as its primary enemy. In this light, the Soviet leadership maintains that actively confronting China in ideological and political terms remains one of the most important tasks of the Warsaw Pact countries.

A lengthy document that addresses several issues related to Communism and China. It covers such topics as Chinese foreign policy, Chinese and American relations, Maoism, Chinese policy regarding developing countries, capitalist countries and other socialist countries.