Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 29

Documents

November 16, 1945

Antonov to Marshal Malinovsky, the Commanding General of the Transbaykal-Amur Military District

Soviet General Aleksei Antonov informs Marshal Malinovsky and V. M. Molotov that the People's Commissar of Defense has ordered Soviet troops to maintain good relations with the Republic of China and avoid letting the Chinese communists draw the Soviet Union into confrontation with the United States.

October 12, 1950

Ciphered Telegram No. 25553, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin]

Mao Zedong has already given orders to halt Chinese troops preparing to cross the Korean border.

July 13, 1950

Cable No. 3355, Filippov [Stalin] to the Soviet Ambassador, Peking

Stalin tells Mao that the British have been pressuring the Soviets to help for the North Koreans to withdraw to the 38th peril, and the Soviets are offended by this, and to want to insist on Soviet and PRC participation in the Security Council to resolve the issue. He also informs Mao of his willingness to send more planes, and more pilots to help train Chinese forces.

March 7, 1952

Cable, Zhou Enlai to Filippov [Stalin]

Zhou Enlai's request to Stalin to increase its assistance by dispatching anti-epidemiological specialists.

May 10, 1942

Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov

Governor Sheng describes the investigation into Sheng Shiqi's (the Commander of the Mechanized Brigade of Xinjiang) death, which revealed that Chen Xiuying (his wife) murdered him under pressure from Xiao Zuoxin, the assistant to the Director of the Urumqi office of the Native Corporation. He also reports that Kruglov, Soviet advisor for trade matters, intentionally disrupted trade between the Soviet Union and Xinjiang because of the Xinjiang government's alleged anti-Soviet attitude.

1936

Telegram from Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov to G. Apresov, Consul General in Urumqi

Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov express alarm about Shicai Sheng's red corner and discussions about the possible Sovietization of Xinjiang, reported in an earlier telegram from G. Apresov. They reaffirm that the USSR has no territorial claims on China, denies any plans for the Sovietization of Xinjiang, and declares its firm support for China in its struggle of independence from Japan, Britain, and other imperialist countries.

January 10, 1938

Concerning NKVD Operations in Xinjiang

The Politburo orders the NKVD to deploy a reinforced cavalry regiment and an attached RKKA fighter squadron to the area of Hami, allocating additional tanks, automobiles, and gasoline trucks to support their operations. It also provides recommended changes to Shicai Sheng's military policy in Xinjiang.

January 9, 1938

Concerning Troop Movements through Xinjiang

The Politburo recommends that Sheng Shicai advise Chiang Kai-shek to permit the regiment currently stationed in Erlizihe to proceed to its designated location.

February 3, 1949

Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Anastas Mikoyan

Cable from Stalin to Mikoyan, sent with the intent to be passed on to Mao Zedong. Stalin expresses pleasure with the Chinese control of China's peasantry and students, but expresses disappointment that the CCP does not control the majority of the working class. Stalin advises that China turn its big cities into bases for communism, and then gives more specific advice for gaining a majority among the working class. Stalin then responds to Mao's request for weapons, explaining that the USSR doesn't have anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons of foreign make, but can send Russian-made weapons.

September 26, 1951

Cable No. 5542, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

Telegram from Stalin to Mao stating that because of the conditions of production and transportation, it is almost impossible to ensure additional supplies (in the amount of the proposed one-fifth of the value of all applications from the September 8 telegram), and at the same time supply six infantry divisions with arms and equipment by the end of the year. Stalin states that they can take Mao's additional order on the delivery of military equipment in 1951, equal to one-fifth of the total cost of China's application, only on the condition that the supply of weapons and equipment for the six divisions are postponed for six months.

Pagination