Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

A Soviet delegation visiting China meets with local representatives of the Society for Soviet-Chinese Friendship (OKSD) and the two groups have a tense conversation about the Soviet handling of the recent Cuban Missile Crisis.

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on the Soviet-Cuban divergence after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Provided with information by the Polish ambassador, Beck believes that the Cubans and Soviets had a strategic plan in placing missiles in Cuba, but the US reaction was more drastic than expected. Beck summarized facts about the crisis from 27-28 October and explains that the Cubans feel betrayed by the Soviet Union and their negotiations with the US.

The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.

Unger and Rodriguez discuss a plethora of topics regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Jelen reports on several points of public opinion regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis situation.

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

Ambassador Max Troendle discusses the situation in the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis in regards to the public opinion and press attacks now being much calmer. He also mentions Israel’s newly arrived ambassador, Joseph Tekoah, who is familiar with the conditions in Latin America from his own experience.

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.