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October 24, 1985

Letter of the Minister for the Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research Luigi Granelli to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

Minister Granelli writes to Andreotti to express his concerns over the French and German hastiness in coming to an agreement over EUREKA. Granelli lists minimum conditions that need to be met to ensure launching the project without running the risk of negative political and economic consequences.

February 8, 1963

Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Defense Policy'

These Council of Ministers minutes report on the meeting between Prime Minister De Quay and several of his state secretaries with NATO Secretary-General Stikker, who gave an outline of what was still called a ‘NATO Nuclear Force’. The prime minister responded positively to the plan but indicated the incoming cabinet would have to take a final decision. In the discussion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns comments on the attitude of President De Gaulle and points out that NATO and EEC matters ought to be viewed separately.

July 26, 1973

Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 'Supplementary Checklist for Meeting with French Defense Minister'

When meeting with the French Defense Minister Kissinger is to stress how much the U.S. has supported France despite negative views on such assistance by European countries and by Congress, and that this president could not be more sympathetic to French needs. The NSSM 175 review of the policy towards France is attached, and it reviews previous aid given to France, complications that arouse due to restrictions on such aid, and what the French are now requesting. It extensively reviews missile assistance, nuclear safety exchanges, and other French aid issues. The second part addresses the issue in light of U.S.-European political relations, and the effect any such aid might have on such relations. It notes that future French aid might be given to hardening technologies, and to aiding in Poseidon information, and to underground nuclear testing, and it weighs the pros and cons in the eyes of the British. It concludes with an overview of how such aid could be in the interest (or not) of the U.S., but several parts of the last part of this document are blacked-out, marked for secrecy.