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Documents

November 5, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Ambassador Helmut Roth, 'US-FRG Consultations on NPT,' with memorandum attached

During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

April 30, 1969

Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'FRG - Further Delay on NPT Signature,' Intelligence Note-327

Noting that the same objections to the NPT remained, INR opined that some West German politicians were using them “to rationalize an opposition that is really based on nationalistic emotions and on the political advantages to be derived from playing upon these emotions.”

November 27, 1968

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty'

According to this CIA evaluation, the West German governing coalition was so divided and so antagonistic to the Soviet Union in light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August that action was “unlikely for the time being.”

July 26, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 14922 to State Department, 'Eppler on NPT'

Erhard Eppler, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag, gave embassy staffers his perspective on the political status of the NPT. Highly critical of Kiesinger for his “hold-back tactics” on signing and ratification, Eppler believed that the longer the delay the more likely that the treaty “would become entangled in election campaign politics.”

January 23, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 7557 to State Department, 'FRG Defense Council Meeting on NPT'

This telegram detailed an FRG Defense Council Meeting on the NPT. While recognizing that the agreement on Article III was “progress,” Kiesinger continued to criticize the treaty’s “inflexibility,” which he saw as a danger to West Germany’s “longer term” security interests. Kiesinger, however, professed willingness to consider signing the Treaty, even to be an early signer, if Washington could comply with a few basic “requests,” such as “safeguards against Soviet pressure” and some improvements in Article III.

October 6, 1967

State Department Telegram 50379 to US Embassy Bonn, 'NPT'

In this meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, West German Embassy official Georg Lilienfeld listed desiderata, including a limited y duration, assurances against Soviet blackmail, acceptable language for the safeguards article, “more balanced rights and obligations,” and non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

May 10, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and State Secretary Baron Guttenberg, 'German Views on NPT and NATO'

This conversation between Rusk and Baron Guttenberg, a top official on Kiesinger’s staff and the CDU foreign policy spokesperson, demonstrated that accepting Bonn’s suggestions for the NPT draft had not made it more acceptable to the West Germans. Guttenberg emphasized the importance of a limited duration clause and the need for the Soviet Union to make a “counter-concession” in exchange for a West German signature on an NPT.

April 26, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger

In this conversation, Johnson and Kiesinger discussed the state of U.S.-German relations, Johnson’s irritation with German critical press coverage and public opinion, Kiesinger’s worries about the NPT and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Johnson’s concern about the high costs of keeping troops in Western Europe, and U.S. interest in a “different relationship with the Soviet Union.”

April 26, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Willie Brandt, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty'

During this meeting, Brandt and Rusk discussed the French attitude toward a West German signature on the NPT, thew problem of "duration", and suggestions for mitigating the West German concerns. Brandt said that De Gaulle “expected” Bonn to sign but if that de Gaulle was asked for advice, he would recommend that Germany not sign.

April 21, 1967

'The President’s Trip to Germany (Chancellor Adenauer's Funeral), April 1967, Background Paper, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Germany'

This document detailed West German suggestions which Washington incorporated into the NPT draft.The cover memorandum reviewed the sources of West German discontent with the NPT.

Pagination