This report assesses the capabilities of North Korea in reference to; the Soviet position, the current political, economic, and military situations, and the current operations against South Korea.

Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

A CIA summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia.

Observations by Israeli and US diplomats of the Soviet Union's attempt at indirect economic penetration of Ethiopia during the mid-1960s. The Ethiopian regime was suspicious of Soviet intervention, thus they had to resort to the help of the East European states, in this case Bulgaria.

Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

An intelligence report that the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay was being changed every six months raised questions about India’s nuclear objectives: a six-month period was quite short for “normal research reactor operations,” but it was the optimum time for using the CIR’s spent fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium. According to INR, India had taken the “first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon,” which was to have “available, on demand, unsafeguarded weapons-grade plutonium or, at the least, the capacity to produce it.”

This report gives an overview of Yugoslavia’s nuclear program and its tight links with both East and West in terms of financial aid and training programs