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Documents

January 11, 1964

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

In this report, Hungarian Ambassador to North Korea József Kovács details a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky and Romanian Ambassador Bodnaras about the Soviet interpretation of North Korean-Chinese relations. Moskovsky states that his predecessors underestimated the situation.

December 22, 1955

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 22 December 1955

Nam Il explains that all Soviet Koreans are facing hostility from local Koreans due to the mistakes of a few individuals, who he says have warranted condemnation by failing to assimilate properly to political and private life in the DPRK. The two also discuss recent developments in Sweden's and Switzerland's efforts to reorganize the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

February 29, 1956

Record of a Conversation between Soviet Embassy Counsellor S. Filatov and DPRK Vice Premier Pak Ui-wan

Pak Ui-wan tells Filatov about a conversation he had with Kim Il Sung regarding Pak Chang-ok, Pak Yeong-bin, and other Soviet Korean party members.

February 25, 1956

Record of a Conversation between Soviet Embassy Counsellor S. Filatov and Pak Yeong-bin

Pak says that while he himself has admitted to his mistakes and engaged in self-criticism, Pak Chang-ok continues to deny that he had engaged in factionalist, anti-Party activity. Pak Yeong-bin also describes several factors that may have played a role in the “The Further Strengthening of the Fight Against Reactionary Bourgeois Ideology in Literature” decision made by Kim Il Sung and the Presidium.

February 21, 1956

Record of a Conversation between Soviet Embassy Counsellor S. Filatov and DPRK Vice Premier Pak Ui-wan

Pak tells Filatov that he does not fully agree with the KWP CC Presidium decision regarding Pak Chang-ok because the Presidium's failure to cite specific evidence. Pak Ui-wan says that he spoke well of Pak Chang-ok in a recent meeting with Kim Il Sung.

December 7, 1955

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 7 December 1955

Ivanov speaks with Kim Il Sung about the proceedings of the most recent KWP CC plenum. The plenum touched upon plans to improve North Korea’s agriculture sector. Ivanov describes in length Kim’s accusation of Chinese and Soviet Korean party members of undermining the party leadership. Ivanov advises against categorizing party members as Soviet, Chinese, or local.

December 6, 1955

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 6 December 1955

Nam Il tells Ivanov that Kim Il Sung is actively working to settle the issue of citizenship among Soviet Koreans in the party. Kim acknowledges that granting them citizenship could help ease relations between them and local Koreans. Nam insists that Kim does not believe that the Soviet Koreans are ill-intentioned.

December 4, 1955

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 4 December 1955

DPRK Vice Premier Pak Ui-wan and Minister of Construction Kim Seung-hwa report to Ivanov about the KWP CC plenum decision to expel Pak Il-u and Kim Yeol from the party and the Central Committee. The conversation touches on the issue of a group of Soviet Korean members who have been accused of supporting anti-Party reactionary writers.

September 17, 1956

Telegram from A. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee

Mikoyan reports on an unsuccessful meeting with a number of Korean delegates, who had clearly been prepped for the conversation, making them reluctant to go beyond instructions and provide more detailed responses about the August Plenum Incident.

September 19, 1956

Draft of Record of a Meeting between the Soviet and Chinese Delegations

Mao Zedong reveals that several Korean Workers' Party members have been placed under arrest, including Pak Il-u, who is looked favorably upon by the CCP. Sino-North Korean relations have become strained as a result of Kim Il Sung's handling of the August incident. Mao admits to Mikoyan that the KWP leadership may not heed their advice, but they decide to send a joint delegation to Pyongyang the next morning.

Pagination