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October 29, 1947

Telegram, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case of opposing proposals from the US, the Soviets should oppose and abstain rather than voting against them.

October 29, 1947

Telegram No. 418 from Vyshinsky

Vyshinsky outlines the amendment that the US has introduced regarding the Korean question. Moreover, Vyshinsky asserts the plan to object to the amendment and express why the amendment is not compatible with the proposal of the Soviets.

October 23, 1947

Draft of Telegram to Vyshinsky on the Korean Question

Vyshinsky is instructed that, because the Korean issue is already on the UNSC agenda, it should remain there. Vyshinsky should stake out a position that both American and Soviet troops withdraw simultaneously, allowing the Koreans to develop a unified government. Elected representatives from both Koreas should be invited to discussions. A time span for the troop withdrawals must be set. The draft includes some scrawled recommendations from Stalin.

October 30, 1947

Telegram, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee.

October 29, 1947

Telegram Nos. 408-411, Vyshinsky to Molotov

Vyshinsky outlines the proceedings at the UN, where discussion of the Korean question and the withdrawal of Foreign troops from Korea has led the Soviets to insist that the Koreans be invited to the discussions. He details counter proposals from the Americans, and Soviet responses to these resolutions.

September 20, 1947

Ciphered Telegram, Molotov to Cde. Stalin

Molotov relates how the Americans have rejected the Soviet position toward establishing a temporary all Korean assembly. While there is some overlap between both positions, this issue has now been exacerbated by Marshall's move to decide it in the UNGA. The Soviets should respond to this move by reiterating their commitment to a self-determined form of government for Korea, which requires the Soviets and Americans to withdraw their troops.

1996

Excerpts from Recollections by the Former Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Aleksandr Kapto

Aleksandr Kapto reflects on the Soviet Union's normalization of relations with South Korea, and the consequential fallout in relations between North Korea and the USSR. According to Kapto, North Korea threatened to develop nuclear weapons and withdraw from the NPT as a result of Soviet-South Korean rapprochement.

October 12, 1973

Verbatim Transcript of the Third Meeting between Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Zhou Enlai

Zhou Enlai and Trudeau have a wideranging conversation on international politics, covering the Vietnam War, Sino-Japanese relations, Nixon's visit to China, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arctic circle, and nuclear energy safeguards, among other topics.

December 1979

The Capability of the Puppet Regime to Launch an Attack on the South: A Comprehensive Analysis

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Cultural Bureau reports on the current situation and information regarding the risk of a North Korea attack, North Korea's military capabilities, and the definiteness of a possible of a North Korean invasion.

July 11, 1948

Record of Conversation between Kim Gu and Liu Yuwan

Kim Gu (Kim Koo) and the Chinese Nationalist Minister Liu Yuwan discuss Kim's participation in the South Korean government, his attendance at a conference in Pyongyang, and the possibility of a Russian-led attack on southern Korea.

Pagination