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Documents

June 5, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

December 5, 1979

Exchange of notes, Defense Minister Scholten (also to other NATO Defense ministers) – British Defense Secretary for Defense

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

October 31, 1979

Letter from Jimmy Carter to Andreas A.M. Van Agt

U.S. President Jimmy Carter writes to Prime Minister Van Agt about the Dutch proposal to cut NATO's TNF modernization proposal.

November 26, 1979

Letter from Prime Minister Van Agt to President Carter

Dutch Prime Minister van Agt responds to President Carter's concerns about a Dutch proposal to reduce NATO modernization. He writes that in light of Carter's concern, he will not press the Dutch proposal but that his government remains concerned over the size of the modernization program.

December 1979

Letter from the Dutch Minister of Defense to the Defense Ministers of Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, and UK.

The Dutch Defense Minister outlines opposition to NATO modernization proposals. He specifically mentions that the program seems not to take arms control efforts into account, while erring too high on the side of missile installation. He points out the tremendous political difficulties supporting such a move would have at home. Also included in this collection are short responses from the UK Minister of Defense.

July 12, 1979

Letter from President Carter to Dutch Prime Minister Andreas van Agt

President Carter writes to Prime Minister Andreas van Agt about the proposal for Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernization and asks for Dutch support.

April 22, 1979

Speaking notes for the talks with Vice President Mondale on TNF and NPG membership

Speaking notes for the Dutch position on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) and also on NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) membership. Notes stress that the Dutch position on TNF is to find an approach that maximizes alliance solidarity. The Dutch are also seeking to become full members of the NPG at the ministerial level.