The report examines the implications of the changes in the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine adopted in May 1987 and its emphasis on the future defensive character of the alliance. The new doctrine stresses that the Warsaw Pact will never initiate military actions against another country unless it is attacked first, the Warsaw Pact will never employ nuclear weapons first, and the Warsaw Pact has no territorial claims against any other country in or outside of Europe.

Vice Secretary General of NATO Rinaldo Petrignani sends PM Giulio Andreotti a report from the meeting of the Italian Atlatic Committee regarding Western European security situation and the threat posed by political and military modernization in the Soviet Union, and in particular, the introduction of SS20 missiles.

The 1978 fall sessions of the Eurogroup and the Defense Planning Committee discussed the Alliance's reaction to new nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and conventional build up of the Warsaw Pact. Even though the NATO states acknowledge that the Soviet Union will not be able to maintain its current efforts due to its economic problems, 1980s are seen as posing risks to the current peace.

Summary of the 13th NPG meeting in Ankara in May 1973. Italian Minister of Defense, Tanassi, raises the issue of reviewing the process of launching nuclear weapons in order to secure the potential military and political advantages.

Document sent by Tanassi (Minister of Defense) to Andreotti (Prime Minister) on the 1973-01-04. Summary of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in London that includes a discussion about the strategic capabilities of the two blocs, consultation procedures, and recent studies on the possible use of nuclear arms. It raises the question of extending NPG membership to include all alliance members, a suggestion met with a negative response.

Speech by the Minister of Defense providing an overview of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Copenhagen. Focuses on the problems of "when" and "why" of employment of nuclear arms in Europe.

Document sent from Minister of Defense Tanassi to Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Topics discussed: comparison of strategic forces (NATO and USSR), studies on potential use of nuclear arms by member states, and the problems of internal consultation within NATO.

The note suggests that French motives for developing nuclear capabilities are political rather than based on national security considerations. France seeks to insure a key role in global political and military balance, and its behavior creates unfavorable conditions for the development of common European defense.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”