This report explains ecological and security problems which arose several years later as a result of the Chernobyl accident, as well as areas for improvement in control of the reactor site and medical testing of the local population. Importantly, it also acknowledges that the potential impact zone includes approximately 4.5 million residents of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, which was, at that time, not widely known.

The Chairman lists a series of directives and responses to the Chernobyl incident, addressed to different levels of KGB cadre, discussing ways to strengthen standards at nuclear power facilities, calling for increased responsibility for the failure of local KGB staff to inform the central command on plant issues, recommending that specialists be pulled in to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities going forward, and implementing more intense oversight at all nuclear plants and scientific research facilities to ensure that issues which may lead to accidents are known.

A report on how military personnel involved in the response to the Chernobyl accident are being improperly managed at the site, leading to inefficiencies in the cleanup process.

The document lists extent to which various information related to Chernobyl which should be classified, and for what reasons certain items may be shared.

The document refers to a conversation with a specialist in nuclear energy, who explains how gaps at the joints of pipes are causing problems in the blocks at both the Chernobyl and Kursk plants.

This document discusses weaknesses in the technical designs of nuclear power plants in the USSR and their potential consequences, concluding that the Leningrad, Kursk, and Chernobyl plants are extremely dangerous.

The document discusses the number of foreigners who visited the Ukrainian SSR, rumored military training of OUN fighters in Southern England, the suspected murder of a Soviet ship captain in international waters, and a Unit 1 reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1982.

The document explains violations of technological norms, labor laws, and assembly work at Chernobyl within one year of its official opening.

This document discusses the violation of technical rules of reinforcement and concrete work in the construction of the Chernobyl plant, concluding that these deficiencies will diminish the quality of the energy output.

The document describes the accident which took place at Chernobyl nuclear power plant prior to 1986 disaster. The information on the accident which took place on 9 September 1982 was classified. The document demonstrates that before the Chernobyl disaster the Soviet government knew about the deficiences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.