This memo informs the Central Committee of the USSR of the Communist Party of India's decision to oppose signing the NPT due to perceived infringements on Indian sovereignty and a mistrust in the concept of security guarantees to India by the US. The recommended course of action is to forward comprehensive information to the CPI about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons along the lines of a March 29 CPSU CC decree of that year in the hopes that the CPI's opinion on the NPT will change.

In this decree, the CPSU CC recommends that a telegram to the Soviet ambassador in India be approved. This telegram would hold information for the Indian CP about the NPT.

In this memo, the Soviet Ambassador to India is urged to meet with the leadership of the Indian Communist Party (Rao and Dange) and inform them, in light of the 22nd UN General Assembly session discussing the NPT, of the Soviet stance on the Treaty. The ambassador is instructed to emphasize the importance of nuclear non-proliferation for international geopolitical reasons, including preventing West Germany and China from acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as increasing domestic prosperity by using the atom for peaceful means. The ambassador is told to emphasize efforts of the USSR to prepare the draft treaty in collaboration with non-nuclear countries, as well as security guarantees in place for non-nuclear countries so that the Indian government greets the Treaty with understanding.

Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.

Soviet representatives being sent to Italy, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, and Italy, are instructed to visit the head of state or the minister of foreign affairs and relay the oral declarations contained in this document. The country-specific oral declarations reinforce the Soviet position against the use of nuclear technology for militaristic objectives and object to proposed measures that would undermine the efficacy of the NPT.

Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This document considers the political consequences of carrying through with the Soviet Union's promise to provide India with an Atomic submarine for scientific purposes.

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

South African Prime Minister Vorster denies the existence of a South African nuclear program and lists hostile steps taken by the United States to exclude South Africa from international nuclear and atomic energy groups. He concludes that "it would seem... the United States officially holds the view that stability in Southern Africa and the future of our country is to be sacrificed in the hope of stopping Soviet expansionism."

UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session.

The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO).

Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.