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Documents

April 3, 1979

Information about the Results of the Official Friendly Visit of A.N. Kosygin in India (March 9-15 of This Year)

This document reports on the visit by the Soviet premier, Alexsei Kosygin, to India in March 1979. The Indian leadership once again confirms its intention to retain close relations with Moscow irrespective of the future relationship with the US and China. During the visit a number of trade and scientific agreements are signed. The USSR expresses its readiness to cooperate in the nuclear field on the basis of peaceful use as laid down in the Indian-Soviet agreement of January 1979. Reacting to the Chinese threat and its perceived objective to gain a hegemonic position in Asia, India wishes to talk about the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment. The Soviet officials interpret Indian foreign policy as moving closer to the Socialist Bloc and joining Vietnam and Cuba in the formation of a ‘leftist wing’ in the Non-Aligned Movement.

May 9, 1977

Information about Negotiations of the Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, with the New Indian leadership (April 25 - 27 of This Year)

This Soviet report on the results of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s April 1977 visit to India encapsulates Moscow’s first impressions of the new Indian Government. The main issue of the Soviet-Indian talks was the maintenance of the close relations between the two countries. The Desai government promises strict adherence to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The new Indian leadership also renewed the commitment not to weaponize its nuclear programme. With respect to China, Desai opposes any new initiatives to improve relations with Beijing.

December 18, 1986

Regarding the Results of the Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to India

This document reports on the visit by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to India in 1986. The report recounts an ever-deepening relationship between India and the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for the Indian position is the strong support for Pakistan by the US, the delivery of modern weaponry to this country together with concerns that Pakistan will soon develop nuclear weapons. Gandhi also accuses Pakistan of training Sikh terrorists on its territory. The Soviet side intends to further intensify its relations with India and to upgrade them by treating India as a full-fledged world power. The aim is to establish a long-term special relationship with India based on common principles in the foreign arena and close collaboration in all other fields.

October 18, 1988

Note about a Meeting between Erich Honecker and Qiao Shi

Erich Honecker and Qiao Shi discuss economic and political reform in China, attempts to foster Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and East German and Chinese attitudes toward chemical and nuclear weapons.

June 8, 1987

Stenographic Transcript of the Official talks between Erich Honecker and Zhao Ziyang

Zhao Ziyang and Honecker discuss economic and political reforms in China, bilateral relations between China and East Germany, attempts to reduce nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles, and China's attitudes toward the Iran-Iraq War, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

June 1975

East German Report on the Eight Interkit Meeting in Ulaanbaatar, June 1975

This report, issued after the eighth Interkit meeting in Ulaanbaatar, addresses the domestic and foreign policies of China and the anti-Maoist propaganda measures to be undertaken by Socialist countries. There are no great expectations for a collapse of Maoism, even though the Chinese economy is developing slowly. China is acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles in preparation for an armed conflict. Beijing's foreign relations with Western countries are considered to be detrimental to international détente and directed against the interests of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries.

March 1974

East German Report on Seventh Interkit Meeting in Budapest, March 1974

This report, issued after the seventh Interkit meeting in Budapest, addresses unsolved socio-economic problems and internal party disputes in China. The new military strategy of the People's Republic as well as its economic development are examined. Beijing's foreign relations with Western countries, especially with the US, are considered to be detrimental to international détente. The attendees condemn China for stockpiling nuclear weapons and missiles in preparation for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, for extending its influence in developing countries, for strengthening the position of NATO, for interfering with the domestic policies of Vietnam, and for supporting the military junta in Chile.

July 3, 1972

East German Report on the Fifth Interkit Meeting in Prague, July 1972

This East German report, issued after the Interkit meeting in Prague, addresses the domestic and foreign policies of China. It makes reference to internal conflicts destabilizing the Chinese leadership. China is said to be enhancing its military potential, especially in the area of missiles and nuclear weapons. Its aims in foreign policy are to acquire a leadership position in the so-called "Third World", to expand its relations with capitalist countries, to damage the unity of the Socialist bloc, and to obstruct the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Considering the increase of influence of China on North Korea, Romania, and Vietnam, as well as on the Communist parties in Spain and Italy, the Socialist countries must improve their anti-Maoist propaganda efforts.

October 14, 1983

Telex from the East German Embassy in Romania to Bucharest, 14 October 1983

Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.

August 3, 1961

Walter Ulbricht's Speech at the Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961

Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.

Pagination