Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

This memo describes the details of the nuclear suppliers' conference, specifically the details of French participation. Cites the need for common understanding regarding nuclear exports is needed and therefore invites Great Britain, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan, and France to participate in the conference. Also details the process of trying to persuade France to participate and dissuading their reluctancy.

US-UK discussion of French nuclear weapons potential and efforts that could be undertaken to hinder or advance the their program. The French request for technical assistance from these two governments was also covered.

Kissinger informs Nixon of a discussion he had with British Defense Minister Denis Healey about French/U.S. military cooperation. Kissinger has told Healey that the French have not approached the U.S., and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. Kissinger and Healey have agreed to inform one another should he be approached for such assistance by France in the future.

The British have not made any military or nuclear alliance with France, and they will disclose any such approaches from France to the United States. The U.S. is willing to say in response that they have not been approached by the French and would be willing to disclose any such approach in the future, but the U.S. is not willing say that their position is exactly the same as the British one because they "are not sure of the detailed implications of the broad phraseology of [the British’s] statement" and do not want to be bound to any extreme commitments.

President Kennedy writes British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the implications for NATO and West German security if the US or UK assisted the French nuclear program.

Laird has made four practical recommendations on how to proceed with French/US nuclear relations. Laird's four points involve information on nuclear effects simulator types, the sale of small simulators, general hardening technology, and/or ABM intelligence. The US has given as much technical assistance as possible thus far within the current guidelines, and it is up to the president to address the issues related to changes in policy to continue the assistance. He is urged to consider especially the impact such aid would have on relations with the UK and the Soviet Union, but we should not cut off all assistance while these issues are being addressed.

When meeting with the French Defense Minister Kissinger is to stress how much the U.S. has supported France despite negative views on such assistance by European countries and by Congress, and that this president could not be more sympathetic to French needs. The NSSM 175 review of the policy towards France is attached, and it reviews previous aid given to France, complications that arouse due to restrictions on such aid, and what the French are now requesting. It extensively reviews missile assistance, nuclear safety exchanges, and other French aid issues. The second part addresses the issue in light of U.S.-European political relations, and the effect any such aid might have on such relations. It notes that future French aid might be given to hardening technologies, and to aiding in Poseidon information, and to underground nuclear testing, and it weighs the pros and cons in the eyes of the British. It concludes with an overview of how such aid could be in the interest (or not) of the U.S., but several parts of the last part of this document are blacked-out, marked for secrecy.

Sonnenfeldt reports on issues with implementing the decisions made in NSDM 103 and 104 to offer military aid to France. Information was leaked to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy about the offer of more advanced computers and technical assistance with France's ballistic missile program. The Department of State had not yet informed the French and was waiting on various decision to be made. The issues of whether or not to inform the British was also raised.

Holsey G. Handyside reports on a meeting with Christopher J. Makins, First Secretary of the British Embassy. Handyside informs Makins that organizational meetings for the US-French nuclear safety talks were planned for May 4-5. The talks will not include any Restricted Data that the French do not already have. Handyside reiterates that the French are not aware that the British have been informed of the exchange. He also asked Makins for his opinion on why the British government has repeated asked for status updates about the talks.