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November 20, 1961

Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report Telegram, 'Foreign Policy Aims of Strauss, Schroeder and some FDP Leaders'

In the weeks following the November 1961 West German federal elections when a new cabinet formed, CIA sources in Bonn provided information on the thinking of the group of “Young Turks” in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s cabinet that included Defense Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

May 6, 1961

State Department Telegram 5245 to US Embassy United Kingdom, forwarding message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

In this telegram, President Kennedy expresses doubts about aiding the French nuclear program to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. He maintained that such an action would shake NATO and signify a "major reversal" in U.S. opposition to "Nth country programs,"subsequently increasing Germany's desire to acquire nuclear weapons.

February 18, 1960

Hugh S. Cuming, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'Growing Revelation of West German Interest in Nuclear Striking Force in Europe'

This State Department intelligence report touched upon a key issue for West German policy: a desire to upgrade West Germany’s nuclear role without putting it in control of nuclear weapons. According to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the West Germans faced a “dilemma” because of the development of Soviet strategic missile capabilities.

February 1, 1958

US Embassy Paris Telegram 3600 to Department of State

In this telegram, U.S. government officials were troubled by the possibility of shared nuclear weapons research in Western Europe. Jean Laloy, the French Foreign Ministry’s director of European affairs, confidentially shared his apprehensions with an Embassy official.

August 12, 1957

Letter from Max Isenbergh, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, to Robert Schaetzel, Office of Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, enclosing 'Franco-German Coordination of Advanced Weapons Research, Development, and Production'

During the summer of 1957, diplomats in London and Washington were becoming uneasy as they learned that France and West Germany were setting up formal arrangements to cooperate in the development of advanced weapons systems.

October 27, 1954

Memorandum of Conversation with British, French, and German Embassy Officials, 'German Atomic Energy Program'

In this meeting, Werner Heisenberg, a key figure in Nazi Germany’s atomic bomb project, reaffirmed the West German commitment not to manufacture atomic weapons to a group of U.S., British, and French officials in Washington.

May 28, 1960

Ministry of Defense Memorandum to the Minister of Defense Andreotti, 'Tripartite Military Agreement'

A collection of progress reports from the sub-commissions of the Accordo Military Tripartito F-I-G of 1957, a military alliance between Italy, France, and Germany, summarizing achievements and future objectives regarding development of co-owned nuclear weapons.

July 15, 1969

German Nuclear Work

Correspondence regarding French diplomatic reporting that West Germany was developing nuclear weapons capability. H.T. Morgan concludes that the French claims are baseless and an example of "flesh creeping" activities to discourage the United Kingdom from nuclear collaboration with West Germany

April 21, 1967

Research Memorandum RSB-46 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Policy on Nonproliferation Moves in Two Directions'

Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.

April 8, 1967

Intelligence Note 273 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'Has West Germany Decided to Try to Scuttle the Non-Proliferation Treaty?'

By the late winter/early spring of 1967, controversy over the NPT was hurting U.S.-West German relations, placing them at perhaps their lowest point during the Cold War. While an earlier report suggested that West Germany would ultimately sign the Treaty, despite objections, only weeks late INR this report was issued wondering whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT.

Pagination