The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 July 1989 describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Honduras, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, China, Chile, Sri Lanka, India, and Panama.

The note is about MacNamara's proposal to establish a Special Committee in order to broaden Allies' participation in the strategic planning of US nuclear deterrent and to reach a more efficient process of political consultation. The document outlines some points related to Italy's position.

The memo deals with the reorganization of political control and of the "command chain" with respect to NATO's nuclear deterrent (opinions of the UK and France, Italian and German criticism).
There are 3 attachments: 1) Multilateral Nuclear Force. Italian stance with regards to British proposals (2 pages); 2) British position on Multilateral Force - Message from Washington on 4th December (5 pages); 3) Reorganization of the Atlantic nuclear deterrent (12 pages).

Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to “play upon French concern” that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

In this meeting, The IKV responds to NATO discussions about a possible introduction of the 'N-bomb' [neutron bomb]. The neutron bomb would will probably be introduced; however the IKV needs to do all that it can to prevent its arrival.