This document outlines guidance for the Soviet delegation to the June 1966 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, specifically on their concerns about the IAEA being involved in efforts to create a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

A draft resolution on formal Soviet accession to the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Soviets contact the ambassador in Geneva about possible discussions with the Swedes and the Polish about the "detection club".

USSR sending regards to the Polish ambassador about Poland joining the international "detection club" for underground nuclear tests.

This document considers the political consequences of carrying through with the Soviet Union's promise to provide India with an Atomic submarine for scientific purposes.

This concept paper addresses the need to base decisions about the nature of military cooperation on the Soviet Union’s long term goal of ending the arms race and moving toward disarmament. It also details how this decision-making should look in specific developing countries in which the Soviet Union has an interest.

Not altogether sure whether the Soviets were really committed to the NPT, the fact that the Soviets had been discussing security assurances with the Indians was seen as evidence that Moscow was interested in having a treaty. India was one of the countries that was especially resistant to the NPT and the Soviets were only one of a number of governments, e.g. Canada, which vainly tried to persuade Indira Gandhi to sign on.

The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”

INR looked closely at Soviet positions on an NPT arguing that the Soviets appeared to “attach a higher priority in using the nondissemination issue as a means of attacking possible NATO nuclear arrangements than in concluding an agreement.”