Recognizing the facts brought out by the Pervez conviction, in January 1988 the Reagan White House invoked and then waived the Solarz amendment.

Adelman advised Armacost to “increase pressure on Pakistan to try to get them to stop enrichment above five percent and to stop illegal procurement activities in the United States.”

During the Armacost-Zia talks, the Pakistanis tell US officials that they will confidentially share any new procurement regulations with them.

A cable detailing a possible plan of action regarding Pakistani nuclear and security concerns. The document includes a brief background on the situation and a three phased strategy with responses on the international stage, the establishment of a Presidential emissary and a “game plan” for Capitol Hill.

A State Department Cable detailing the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo to Washington D.C. According to administration officials, Junejo was “astute and well briefed” and professed to be responsive to the U.S. emphasis on the “absolute criticality” of “restraint” in Pakistani nuclear activities. In meetings with the press, Junejo “specifically affirmed” commitment not to enrich uranium above the five percent level.

A briefing book for the July 15th-21st visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo to Washington. The book covers a wide range of topics including a summary of the US-Pakistani relationship, US and Pakistani goals, visitation schedules and topics for discussion including Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear program and narcotics

A letter from the United States Control and Disarmament Agency assessing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and US security assistance. Three main issues and possible courses of actions are discussed; they include President Reagan’s “red lines,” certification of Pakistani nuclear activity and convincing Congress to continue aid to Pakistan after September 1987.

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

Secretary of State George Shultz’s letter to President Reagan covering the history of US responses to Pakistan’s nuclear program and future courses of action by the United States. While each option will rescind United States’ aid money, the Secretary details three different ways to go about it, with varying political implications for each.

In a follow-up message after his trip to Islamabad, Ambassador General Vernon Walters noted that at the end of the conversation with Zia the Pakistani President had given his “word of honor” that Pakistan “will not develop a nuclear device or a weapon.”