Kuydryavtsev confirms the Cuban request for a delivery of military equipment from the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro and Dorticos then discuss the details of failed invasion of Cuba and its effects in Cuba and the US. Castro suggests that the UN should guarantee that the US will stop interfering with and supporting counterrevolutionaries in Cuba.

In a top secret report, Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck describes a recent meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. Beck divides the conversation among five categories—agriculture, industry, central planning, counter-revolutionary activities, and the party. Dorticos reports improvements and obstacles (e.g. agricultural production is developing, though slowly, and the growth of the party remains in its initial stages of formation).

Vidaković reports to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on the diplomatic efforts of many Cuban officials (Roa, Dorticos, etc.). Vidakovic is worried they might not be approaching the situation (the Cuban Missile Crisis) with the appropriate fervor, which might, he believes, lead to a hysterical over-reaction at some point.

Vidaković describes the positions of both Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, with whom he met, and U Thant, who sent him a message. Both men relay the difficulties in dealing with the Cuban situation, especially concerning the resolution to the UN on inspections in Cuba and the imminent danger of a possible American attack.

A telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Cuba describing the speech of Cuban President Dorticós, in the UN, as extremely ponderous and even conservative, by Cuban standards. Dorticos alluded at length to the North-American threats against Cuba, evidencing therefore, one more time, the “complex of invasion” that has motivated in large measures the comportment of the revolutionary government in international politics. Dorticos affirmed, moreover, that Cuba desires a “policy of peace and of coexistence” with all countries of the Continent, within an “absolute respect to the principle of non-intervention.”

A report from the Cuban Mission to the UN concerning a conversation with Anastas Mikoyan and US President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The three are mostly focused on discussing US-Latin American diplomatic relations, and concerns over American military presence in Latin America, specifically the US fly-overs. Kennedy continues to reiterate the US's position on 'no US invasion of Cuba.'

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

Alekseev and Mikoyan discuss the nature of UN inspections in Cuba with Cuban leadership. Cuban leadership discusses what they feel is a Soviet concession to the US, thereby weakening the international socialist movement.