Kissinger details a plan to hold separate talks with the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain with the aim of bringing them closer to the US position and press them to share responsibility for success.

A summary of the report of the Indian Mission to Lhasa covering January-April 1954.

Robert Zimmerman explains why UK authorities have stopped receiving copies of the reports from the Indian Mission in Lhasa from the Government of India.

The Secretary of State hopes that the US Embassy in London and the Consulate General in Calcutta can continue to receive the reports of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.

The Secretary of State asks the US Embassy in London to try to continue obtaining copies of the reports sent by the Indian Mission in Lhasa.

The memorandum describes a difference between President Carter and the West Europeans over their commitment to limiting reprocessing and plutonium supplies for R&D work on breeder reactors.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

According to intelligence reports, the French were trying to acquire from US firms the diagnostic technology needed to measure a nuclear explosion. INR did not believe that France had identified a specific test site and noted that France was under pressure to hold a test somewhere other than North Africa; nevertheless it went ahead with one in Algeria in early 1960.