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Aerial view of National Mall

North America

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Middle East

Israel

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Israeli Nuclear History

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France

Nuclear Proliferation

"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

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China

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United States. Department of State

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A photo of Henry Kissinger from 1975

Kissinger, Henry

1923-

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United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

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Japanese Nuclear History

Photograph of Dean Rusk

Rusk, Dean

1909- 1994

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Hughes, Thomas Lowe

1925-

Photograph of John F. Kennedy in 1963

Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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December 29, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation with West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'German Concern Over Draft NPT Text' In this conversation, Ambassador Knappstein expressed concern over the draft of the NPT that Washington and Moscow had agreed on. Knappstein worried that the draft articles would foreclose “all of the available options for participation in nuclear defense."
November 28, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director ACDA, and Leonard S. Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary, 'Revised Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty,' enclosing Memorandum for the President, 'Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty' Further review on the proposed NPT by ACDA and State Department lawyers in this report concluded that the language would “not disturb existing bilateral relationships,” that is, arrangements to provide U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in NATO countries for the use of West German forces and other allies in the event of war.
November 26, 1966	Message to the President from Secretary Rusk In this message, Secretary Rusk reported to President Johnson that the Soviet non-transfer principle, which ruled out MLF-type arrangements but left open other alternatives, was a “good formulation” that would be “acceptable” to the incipient West German “Grand Coalition” government.
October 17, 1966	US Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Harlan Cleveland, 'Notes on Washington Trip' In the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Harlen Cleveland's notes on his meeting with Secretary Rusk, Cleveland details Rusk's thoughts about Soviet interest in the NPT. According to the Secretary, the “Soviets should have no real difficulty in finding a common interest with us in signing a treaty which enshrines [the] two self-denying provisions” of no-transfer to non-nuclear weapons states and “no relinquishment of control by the US over US warheads.”
September 23, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the President, enclosing 'Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation' In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of “pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities.”
July 11, 1966	Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary of State, 'Comments on the Proposed Revision of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with enclosures In this memorandum, McNamara, Rusk, and Adrian Fisher discuss amendments and language of the NPT treaty that was in stalemate that summer. Fisher saw the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, with its prohibition of the “transfer of atomic weapons to any other country,” as providing model language for an NPT because it was compatible with the bilateral agreements.
July 1, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation between William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Karl Carstens, State Secretary at the West German Foreign Office, 'Disarmament and Related Problems' In this conversation, West German State Secretary Karl Carstens told ACDA director William C. Foster that Bonn was still committed to a “hardware” solution, “if not in the form of an MLF than in some form.” Refraining from making any commitment, Foster wanted to leave the question “open.”
March 9, 1966	Department of State Airgram A-168 to US Embassy West Germany, 'NIE 23-66: West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons' At the request of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the agencies that belonged to the U.S. Intelligence Board began work on a National Intelligence Estimate to provide a “comprehensive analysis” of West German nuclear “capabilities and intentions.” In this Airgram, the State Department requested input from the Bonn embassy on the upcoming NIE.
November 1, 1965	Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary, 'Dobrynin’s October 29 Oral Statement on Nonproliferation' In this report, the INR commented on Soviet policy language regarding nuclear proliferation. They called Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin's criticism of MLF proposals "absurd," telling Secretary Rusk that “in no way can we be blamed for taking steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons."
October 27, 1965	'The Danger from a Psychotic Germany,' Appendix to 'The Case for a Strong American Lead to Establish a Collective Nuclear System That Would Help the Western World from Repeating an Old Mistake,' attached to George W. Ball to Secretary Rusk, et al. Under Secretary George W. Ball signed off on a fervent expression of his apprehensions about the direction of West German policy should the West fail to establish an MLF leading Bonn to feel “rejection and discrimination.” Ball saw three bad possibilities: a national nuclear program, a French-German nuclear deal, or “the real danger, a German political adventure.”